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It has long been known that in finite economies Classical Utilitarianism commends policies that encourage large 
populations. It has been known also that the stronger is the aversion to risk and inequality in the standard of living, 
the lower is the optimum living standard, and that the latter tends in the limit to Sidgwick's "hedonistic zero". A 
version of that extreme feature of the theory was subsequently named the Repugnant Conclusion (RC). Most escape 
routes from RC have invoked the language of "gains" and "losses", which are familiar notions in social cost-benefit 
analysis. Those notions have been found to lead to paradoxes involving the Non-Identity Problem. In this paper I 
start with Sidgwick's theory in its pristine form - the criterion for evaluating states of affairs is the sum of personal 
utilities - but recast it in a contemporary language: the ground of binding reason is taken to be "well-being", not 
"happiness", nor "agreeable consciousness". Sidgwick erred in his interpretation of the hedonistic zero, which may 
explain why the seeming pro-natalism inherent in his theory has been found to be repugnant by philosophers. 
Problems with Sidgwick's Utilitarianism lie elsewhere. An example is presented which invites an additional but 
relatively mild notion of person-hood into any theory that says that personal well-beings should be the sole basis 
for ranking states of affairs. A weak version of Agent-Relative theories is drawn from the example, which in the 
context of population ethics may be called Generation-Relative Utilitarianism. It has however been suggested that 
the theory is incoherent because it does not yield a binary relation between states of affairs. I show that the 
incoherence would arise only if states of affair were to be evaluated from nowhere, and that it is an essential feature 
of Generation-Relative Utilitarianism that the state of affairs from which other states of affairs are viewed, matters. 
The theory is then put to work in a model economy facing an indefinite future and a finite flow of resources. 
Empirical studies of Earth's life support system are then used to justify the choice of the model. I make use of 
contemporary global statistics to get a feel for the theory's implications for both population size and the standard 
of living. Population size is found to be smaller and the living standard higher than they would be under Sidgwick's 
Utilitarianism. Population ethics is then used to understand the nature of loss that would be suffered in the face of 
human extinction. Generation-Relative Utilitarianism is shown to arrive at the view that each generation is a trustee 
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3Abstract
It has long been known that in finite economies Classical Utilitarianism commends
policies that encourage large populations. It has been known also that the stronger is the aversion
to risk and inequality in the standard of living, the lower is the optimum living standard, and that
the latter tends in the limit to Sidgwick's "hedonistic zero". A version of that extreme feature of
the theory was subsequently named the Repugnant Conclusion (RC). Most escape routes from
RC have invoked the language of "gains" and "losses", which are familiar notions in social cost-
benefit analysis. Those notions have been found to lead to paradoxes involving the Non-Identity
Problem. In this paper I start with Sidgwick's theory in its pristine form - the criterion for
evaluating states of affairs is the sum of personal utilities - but recast it in a contemporary
language: the ground of binding reason is taken to be "well-being", not "happiness", nor
"agreeable consciousness". Sidgwick erred in his interpretation of the hedonistic zero, which may
explain why the seeming pro-natalism inherent in his theory has been found to be repugnant by
philosophers. Problems with Sidgwick's Utilitarianism lie elsewhere. An example is presented
which invites an additional but relatively mild notion of person-hood into any theory that says
that personal well-beings should be the sole basis for ranking states of affairs. A weak version
of Agent-Relative theories is drawn from the example, which in the context of population ethics
may be called Generation-Relative Utilitarianism. It has however been suggested that the theory
is incoherent because it does not yield a binary relation between states of affairs. I show that the
incoherence would arise only if states of affair were to be evaluated from nowhere, and that it is
an essential feature of Generation-Relative Utilitarianism that the state of affairs from which
other states of affairs are viewed, matters. The theory is then put to work in a model economy
facing an indefinite future and a finite flow of resources. Empirical studies of Earth's life support
system are then used to justify the choice of the model. I make use of contemporary global
statistics to get a feel for the theory's implications for both population size and the standard of
living. Population size is found to be smaller and the living standard higher than they would be
under Sidgwick's Utilitarianism. Population ethics is then used to understand the nature of loss
that would be suffered in the face of human extinction. Generation-Relative Utilitarianism is
shown to arrive at the view that each generation is a trustee of the capital it inherits from its
predecessor.
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      One such injunction emanates from the cult of the ancestor, which takes religion to be the1
act of reproducing the lineage. See Fortes (1978).
      In South Asia children have been observed to be at work from as early an age as six. 2
      Evolutionary biologists distinguish reproductive strategies in the animal kingdom that3
correspond to the two extreme types of fertility and human capital outcomes displayed in Table
1. An r-strategy gives rise to many offspring combined with low parental investment, and each
offspring has a low probability of survival. In contrast a K-strategy gives rise to few offspring
over a longer lifespan and high parental investment. The motivation driving animals is inclusive
fitness. Each of the strategies is an equilibrium, depending on the underlying evolutionary game.
I am grateful to Nicholas Humphrey for discussions on the significance of animal behaviour for
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People have children for many reasons. The mix of motivations depends on the customs
and institutions we inherit, as well as on our character and circumstances. That children are
valuable in themselves is emotionally so compelling that it may seem too obvious to require
acknowledgement, but social anthropologists have shown that children are not just valuable to
us because of the innate desire we have to bear and rear them, but also because they represent the
fulfilment of tradition and religious dictates, and because they are the clearest avenue open to
self-transcendence. A common refrain, that our children are priceless, is an expression of how
innately valuable they are to us.1
Nevertheless, in places where formal institutions are underdeveloped, children also
substitute for other assets, and are thus also valuable for the many benefits they bring to their
parents. This is most apparent in the poorest regions of the world. Children serve as security in
old-age in places that have neither pension schemes nor adequate land markets. They are also a
source of labour in households possessing few labour saving devices. Children mind their
siblings, tend to domestic animals, pick berries and herbs, collect firewood, draw water, and help
with cooking. Children in poor countries are valued by their parents also as capital and producer
goods.2
1 Economic Demography
Those childhood activities are so unfamiliar today in the West that they direct us to study
the mix of motivations governing procreation by contrasting rich regions from poor regions.
There are notable exceptions of course, but broadly speaking fertility and mortality rates are high
and health status and education attainments are low in poor countries, whereas the corresponding
statistics in rich countries read the other way. Table 1, which presents a snap shot (year 2010),
speaks to that by displaying the classification used at the World Bank, where "rich" and "poor"
are defined in terms of GDP per capita. Countries have been known to make a transition from
one category to the other (that's what economic development is usually taken to mean); moreover,
the bulk of the world's population and a majority of the world's poorest people live in neither rich
nor poor countries, and international statistics say there are enormously rich people in poor
countries. It nevertheless pays to study sharp contrasts, as in Table 1.3
population ethics.             
      Decisions on consumption, production, and our use of the natural environment also create4
externalities. They are connected to reproductive externalities. Here I focus on decisions over
reproduction. We uncover the pervasiveness of externalities in Section 9.
      For theoretical models that speak to the mutual determination, see Dasgupta (1993, 2010),5
Brander and Taylor (1998), Harford (1998), and Dasgupta and Ehrlich (2013). Sub-Saharan
Africa has long been regarded as special, even among poor regions (Goody, 1976; Bledsoe, 1994;
Guyer, 1994; Bongaarts and Casterline, 2013). In an early review of fertility intentions Cochrane
and Farid (1989) noted that both the urban and rural, the educated and uneducated in sub-Saharan
Africa have more, and want more, children than their counterparts in other less-developed
regions. Even young women there expressed a desire for an average of 2.6 more children than
women in the Middle East, 2.8 more than women in North Africa, and 3.6 to 3.7 more than
women in Latin America and Asia. Updated versions of these figures are available, but it is worth
considering the data from the mid-1980s because the income gap between Africa and the rest of
the developing world was smaller at that time than it is now.
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Reproductive decisions have consequences for others (including our descendants) that
are unaccounted for under the terms of prevailing institutional arrangements (markets,
government policy, communitarian engagements, religious injunctions). Economists use the term
"externalities" to denote those consequences of our decisions for others that are unaccounted for.
Externalities raise deep ethical issues. Not only do they extend to contemporaries and can be
expected to extend to future people, it is also that some people will be born in consequence of
the decisions we take, while some who would have been born had we acted otherwise will not
be born.4
Caldwell (1981, 1982) drew on a suggestion implicit in the contrast displayed in Table
1; that the intergenerational transfer of economic resources is from children to parents in poor
societies, but from parents to children in rich societies. The suggestion has been easier to confirm
in rich countries, where the rate of investment in children's education has been found to be as
high as 6-7 per cent of GDP (Haveman and Wolfe, 1995). Confirming the reverse flow in poor
countries has been a lot harder, in part because data are sparse but in part also because even
within poor regions there are significant differences in attitudes toward reproduction. Those
differences are traceable to kinship structures, marriage practices, and rules of inheritance. The
implied line of thinking says that over the long run it is differences in institutions and social
norms - originating perhaps in some measure in geography - that are the reasons behind
differences in reproductive behaviour among groups. Theoretical models have been built on that
premise. Causality isn't traced to differences in income or wealth. It is not that fertility and
mortality rates are high and health status and education attainments are low in poor regions
because people there are poor, it is that very low incomes go hand in hand with those features
of life. The variables are mutually determined over time.5
Table 1 is a snapshot. There is no suggestion that poor regions will remain poor, nor that
      The classic on this is Maddison (2001), who provided estimates of expectancy of life at6
birth, population size, and output from 1 CE until year 1998 in various regions of the world.
      See the references in footnote 5, and Galor (2011). 7
      "Parental choices" are only a contemporary way of alluding to choices that are often, perhaps8
even usually, influenced by the extended family, kinship, and the couple's peer group. On this
see Dasgupta (1993, 2010) and Dasgupta and Dasgupta (2010).    
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rich regions may not find their place reversed in the long run. Regional differences in fertility,
education, and output per capita were slight until the start of the Early Modern era (roughly, 1500
CE). Global aggregates of earlier eras look much the same as their regional aggregates.  Although6
regional aggregates have diverged since then, global aggregates (a weighted average of regional
statistics) have shown a steady move toward and beyond the "fertility transition"; that is, the
transition from high fertility and mortality rates to low fertility and mortality rates.
Economists have offered a number of explanations for the historical experience.  What7
is common to them is a presumption that parental choices over fertility, consumption, and
investment determine long run outcomes. The models trace the relative urgencies of parental
needs, desires, and obligations to the constraints on choices facing parents in each generation.
Some authors stress economic constraints, others pay attention to social and ecological
constraints. Economic demographers have commonly avoided moral theories in their study of
reproductive behaviour.8
In contrast, philosophical discourses on population have been built exclusively on
normative reasoning, directed at (broadly speaking) four questions: (1) What are the nature,
ground, and limits of parental responsibility for existing children? (2) Does producing a child
violate the rights or interests of children the couple already have? (3) Do individuals have a duty
not to have children whose lives may be considered "bad"? Do they have a duty to have children
whose lives might be considered "good"? (4) What procedure should be used to determine the
relative value of possible populations so as to decide which of those would be "best"? In
addressing these questions, however, moral philosophers have avoided offering even a sketch of
the constraints under which that reasoning is to be put to work.
One way to contrast these two disciplinary approaches is to say that the economic
demographer's task is to explain Table 1 and that the aim in population ethics is to produce a
normative theory that one could use to evaluate the behaviour patterns that give rise to Table 1
and then prescribe better ones. That said, no system of ethics should have to yield
incontrovertible directives in all conceivable circumstances. In order to arrive at satisfactory
demographic policies, a suitable accommodation has to be found for the demographer's evidence,
the economist's concerns, the environmental scientist's predilections, and the philosopher's
sensibilities. In the remainder of the paper I study population ethics with an eye on ecological
constraints. We will find that it is possible to produce sensible answers to problems that arise in
      I have taken the attribution from the essay by Kavka (1982) which, with an accompanying9
essay by Parfit (1982), explored the complexities of the Non-Identity Problem.    
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the world we have come to know even if we are unable to make progress in answering the kinds
of question population ethicists usually ask in the context of extreme cases.
2 Utilitarian Ethics
In his introduction to Utilitarianism, Sidgwick (1907: 415-416) wrote:
"... if we take Utilitarianism to prescribe, as the ultimate end of action, happiness as a
whole, and not any individual's happiness, unless considered as an element of the whole, it would
follow that, if the additional population enjoy on the whole positive happiness, we ought to weigh
the amount of happiness gained by the extra number against the amount lost by the remainder.
So that, strictly conceived, the point up to which, on Utilitarian principles, population ought to
be encouraged to increase, is not that at which average happiness is the greatest possible ... but
that at which the product formed by multiplying the number of persons living into the amount
of average happiness reaches its maximum."
Scholars have found a problem with the opening sentence. Sidgwick starts by noting that
the ground of binding reason is total happiness ("happiness as a whole") but goes on to appeal
to gains and losses when applying the Utilitarian calculus. That the two aren't equivalent if the
timing of conceptions (never mind the number of conceptions) is affected by decisions was noted
by Parfit (1976), Schwartz (1978), and Adams (1979) and shown to give rise to what is now
known as the Non-Identity Problem.  The problem, as Parfit (1982, 1984) posed it, goes like this:9
"A woman suffers from a medical condition. There is a large chance that if she were to
conceive now, the child would suffer from a disability but would otherwise enjoy a good life.
However, a minor medical treatment would cure the woman within a month. Once cured, any
child she bears will be free of the disability and enjoy a life of high quality. The woman is
somewhat impatient to conceive. Ought she to wait a month, or would it be reasonable of her to
conceive now?"
One can argue that it is reasonable she conceives now. After all, or so the argument could
go, the woman's feelings matter and the child she conceives now can't complain later that she was
unfair to him, that she should have waited and undergone the medical treatment, that had she
done so he would have had a better life. The reason he would not have grounds for complaint is
that had she waited, the child she would have conceived wouldn't have been him. Nor, or so the
argument may continue, can some unconceived child complain that the woman prevented him
from being born by being hasty. Nonetheless, as Parfit and others observed, there is a strong
intuition that the woman should wait. And the intuition is built not only on the thought that good
lives are an intrinsic good, but also that better lives are intrinsically even better.
In this intuition the basis for evaluation is not "gains" and "losses", but total utility. And
an ethics grounded on the latter reflects the view that lives have an intrinsic value of their own,
      There has been a revival of interest in the Non-Identity Problem. Boonin (2014) is a book-10
length treatment and has a comprehensive set of references. I have gained much from reading an
unpublished paper on the subject by Christopher Cowie (Cowie, 2015).
      Griffin (1986) contains a measured, book-length analysis of the concept in its many guises.11
To put it in the briefest way, he thinks of personal well-being as the extent to which one's
informed desires are realized. Griffin also discusses the problems that arise in measuring the
object.
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supporting Sidgwick's insistence that it is "happiness as a whole" that is the ultimate basis for
population ethics. Utility is taken to be a numerical measure of happiness. The Non-Identity
Problem doesn't rear its head in the version of Sidgwick's Utilitarianism I work with because it
asks us to evaluate alternative states of affairs in terms of the sum of personal utilities. State of
affairs X is judged to be superior to state of affairs Y if total utility in X exceeds total utility in Y.
That comparison can be made without invoking benefits and losses in utilities.10
Sidgwick's theory, or what is widely known as Classical Utilitarianism, involves two
related notions: a person's happiness (whose numerical measure is her utility) and the way
individual utilities are combined to yield a notion of aggregate utility. The aggregate he
commended is obtained by summing individual utilities. Subsequently I will depart from
Sidgwick on the latter count and propose an alternative that commends itself. Sidgwick (1907:
119-150) contains three chapters on empirical hedonism, where the sense in which "happiness"
(or "agreeable consciousness") is used is a lot more considered than is suggested in the frequent
criticism that Classical Utilitarianism views humans to be mere pleasure machines. Nevertheless
I am reluctant to give the impression that the ethical structure I am led to relies on Sidgwick's
notion of the personal good, namely, happiness. So I shall use the term "well-being".11
3 Plan of the Paper
"Well-beingism" reads distinctly odd. So we will call the theory that evaluates states of
affair in terms of the sum of individual well-beings, Total Utilitarianism, even though the raw
material out of which it is constructed is personal well-being, not personal happiness. Section 4
explores how far that theory is able to guide population ethics before running into trouble. I do
that by putting the theory through its paces in a timeless world with finite resources.
My idea here is to construct a framework for population ethics that accommodates
contemporary sensibilities over birth and death. In Section 5 I show that Sidgwick erred in his
reading of a "neutral life", which is a life that goes neither well nor badly. That error recurs in
contemporary writings on population ethics. Criticisms of Total Utilitarianism built on that
misreading and the paradoxes the theory is thought to harbour are thus misplaced. In Section 6
an example is constructed to show that problems with Total Utilitarianism lie elsewhere. I
explore a way that suggests itself for amending the theory. It involves introducing a notion of
person-hood and combining personal well-beings in a different manner from Total Utilitarianism.
The amended version evaluates states of affair in terms of a suitably weighted sum of individual
      In the Appendix the model is extended to include production. 12
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well-beings, in which the weight awarded to well-beings of potential people is lower than to the
well-beings of present and future people. I call the amended version Generation-Relative
Utilitarianism. In Section 7 Generation-Relative Utilitarianism is applied to a simple example
in a timeless world. The theory is shown to recommend a smaller population and a higher living
standard than Total Utilitarianism. Parfit (1976) and, following him Broome (2004: 157-162),
have argued that Generation-Relative ethics is incoherent because it doesn't yield a binary
relation between states of affairs. I show that the theory only appears incoherent, and does so
because the the theory Parfit appeals to views states of affairs from nowhere. Generation-Relative
Utilitarianism instead evaluates states of affair from inside the states of affairs themselves.
In Sections 8-10 the theory is applied to a world that moves through time. So as to allow
for easy comparison with the timeless world of Sections 4 and 7, the model I construct does not
permit capital accumulation. We assume that nature provides a constant flow of consumption
services, like manna from heaven. Assuming that people are identical, consumption at each date
is distributed equally among all who are present. The ethical tradeoff is then between population
size and the average level of consumption. We find that the ideal, or optimum, policy under
Generation-Relative Utilitarianism can only be achieved if there is an implicit understanding
among the generations. That understanding sees each generation as a trustee of the basis on
which the optimum policy is implemented.
An absence of production in our model will be shown not to mislead.  What could12
mislead however is the presumption that the economy's institutions are so good that we are
wholly discouraged from wasting nature's services (in Section 9 I review global statistics that are
pertinent to the issue). But it is the natural assumption to make about a world that seeks to
identify an ideal population policy.
In Section 10 I work with the model by using the Global Footprint Network's estimates
of the magnitude of the ecological services our biosphere offers us. I conduct a sensitivity
analysis of Generation-Relative Utilitarianism by varying key ethical parameters. In all cases the
theory is found to recommend a smaller population in stationary state than Total Utilitarianism.
The standard of living is consequently higher. Because I make use of global estimates, I am able
to lay bare the quantitative differences between the two ethical theories.
Like Total Utilitarianism, Generation-Relative Utilitarianism offers a way to get a
measure of the loss that is suffered when someone dies. And like Total Utilitarianism, the theory
can be used to get a measure of the loss that would be entailed if the human race were to become
extinct. Loss in the latter case would be forward looking; it would reflect the value of lives that
would be foregone on account of extinction. In a remarkable work the late Jonathan Schell drew
our attention away from that line of reasoning and spoke of the loss each of us would suffer if
      Edgeworth (1881) routinized the assumption of diminishing marginal well-being.13
The presumption that the sole factor in well-being is consumption may seem otiose.
People have argued that what shapes one's life are personal and social engagements. (There are
other factors such as genetic endowment, which at least for now are not subject to choice by the
person. We may regard them as parameters of the U-function.) But because all engagements
require goods and services, we may think of engagements as production activities, in which
goods and services are inputs. Partaking in a meal (alone or in the company of others) is an
engagement, but food items are the inputs that make the meal possible. Friendship involves
investment in time, which is a scarce resource. And so on. Goods and services come with various
characteristics, and for each person there is (given the resources at her command) a best way of
obtaining the commodities that are best suited for the activities that are from her point of view
the best for her to engage in. Of course, the best way of obtaining goods and services with those
characteristics involves further engagements (getting a job, making contacts), and so on; but the
regress is circular, meaning that it is closed. The economist's presumption that the only things
people care about are goods and services should be seen as a filtered expression of their projects
and aims. Commodities have instrumental value; they don't necessarily have intrinsic worth.
However, irrespective of what a person values, she will be found to value commodities. The U-
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we were to learn that no one will follow us. In Section 11 I review Schell's argument and modify
it by enlarging the scope of that loss. By extending the sphere of human motivations we avoid
a free-rider problem to which Schell's ethics could be vulnerable. The deep human need to live
through time rather than in time is then used in Section 11 to arrive at a view of personal - and
thereby collective - stewardship of Earth. Acknowledgement of stewardship points also to an
implicit understanding among the generations to protect and promote the biosphere's ability to
support life. But it arrives at it from a different direction from the one we are led to by
Generation-Relative Utilitarianism. The amended account of personal motivation is not meant
to be a substitute for Generation-Relative Utilitarianism, it will be found to be a complement to
it. Nor is the implicit understanding among generations contrary to Total Utilitarianism's idea of
the universal good. Or so I will argue.
4 The Genesis Problem
Total Utilitarianism, in the form Sidgwick cast it, was applied to a timeless economy by
Meade (1955) and extended by Dasgupta (1969) to a world facing an indefinite future. In the
latter publication it was shown that the theory encourages large populations. I reproduce that
finding by working with a stripped-down version of the model in Dasgupta (1969).
We imagine a timeless world, endowed with a finite stock of resources (Nature) of size
K. Because I want the model to reflect the constraints our finite Earth imposes on us over the
long run in the simplest possible way, I assume in the text that is no production. The resource
serves only as a general consumption good (ecological services). As the world is timeless, stocks
(Nature) and flows (ecological services) are the same. In footnote 16 and the Appendix I extend
the model to include production.
People are identical. If C is someone's consumption level (C defines her living standard),
her personal well-being is U(C). The well-being function U is taken to be increasing and
continuous in C, and to increase with C at a diminishing rate.  Positive well-being records life13
function in the text should be interpreted in that light. I make the innocuous further assumption
that U(C) is a differentiable function of C. That enables us to use the calculus for solving for the
optimum population size.   
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as good, negative well-being records life as bad. U is positive at large values of C but negative
at small values of C. It follows that there is a unique value of C at which U is zero. The model
being stark, I identify the living standard with consumption and write the standard of living at
which U = 0 as C . Thus U(C ) = 0. Sidgwick would have called C  the living standard at theS S S
"hedonistic zero"; Meade (1955) called it "welfare subsistence". Because the notion of personal
well-being here differs from the one adopted by Sidgwick and Meade, C  is more accuratelyS
called "well-being subsistence". Figure 1 depicts a well-being function U(C) with those features.
4.1 Zero Well-Being 
Sidgwick (1907: 124-125) spoke of "neutral feeling" when suggesting ways to identify
the hedonistic zero:
"If pleasure ... can be arranged in a scale, as greater or less in some finite degree, we are
led to the assumption of a hedonistic zero, or perfectly neutral feeling, as a point from which the
positive quantity of pleasures may be measured... For pain must be reckoned as the negative
quantity of pleasure, to be balanced against and subtracted from the positive in estimating
happiness on the whole; we must therefore conceive, as at least ideally possible, a point of
transition in consciousness at which we pass from the positive to the negative. It is not absolutely
necessary to assume that this strictly indifferent or neutral feeling ever occurs. Still experience
seems to show that a state at any rate very nearly approximating to it is even common: and we
certainly experience continual transitions from pleasure to pain and vice versa, and thus (unless
we conceive all such transitions to be abrupt) we must exist at least momentarily in this neutral
state."
Zero well-being is a defining notion in population ethics. Sidgwick's reference to neutral
feeling invites us to assess life from the inside. But the idea of neutral feeling also points, at least
tangentially, to a comparison of life with non-existence. That latter exercise requires calibrating
well-being in terms of something outside our experience. Nagel (1979) famously suggested that
death is not an unimaginable condition of the living person, but a mere blank, and that it can have
no value whatever, positive or negative. I can't tell whether by that Nagel meant the blank can't
be assigned the number zero, as a benchmark against which other states of affairs are compared,
but he went on to suggest that one can imagine non-existence by imagining being in a coma for
the rest of one's life. For Nagel non-existence is the real blank, being totally unconscious for the
rest of one's life is a simulation of that blank. Even that simulated state takes some strain to
      Nagel (1979: 2): "... the value of life and its contents does not attach to mere organic14
survival: almost everyone would be indifferent (other things equal) between immediate death and
immediate coma followed by death twenty years later without reawakening." I develop this point
in Section 5, but apply it to a different purpose from Nagel's.    
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imagine, but it isn't absurd to imagine it.14
We are thinking of someone's life as a whole, not the quality of her life at a moment in
time. There are thinkers who believe the whole is the sum of its momentary parts; there are others
who believe the whole to be a non-linear functional of those parts. We don't need to adopt a
position on that because excepting for the model we analyse in Sections 8 and 10, there will be
no occasion to slice someone's life into parts. Lives are judged to be good or bad in comparison
to non-existence. That's an essential feature of population ethics, because the grammar we
construct has to offer a criterion with which to judge when creating a person is justified. The U-
function here is calibrated by using non-existence as a point of reference. Without loss of
generality we attach the number 0 to that point. Zero well-being is therefore the measure of a life
that, taken as a whole, goes neither well nor badly. In view of the additive structure that
characterises Total Utilitarianism's conception of aggregate utility, U = 0 is also the level of well-
being at which an additional life adds no additional value to the population that contains it.
In conversations I have heard it suggested that U = 0 is the point of indifference between
dying and continuing to live, or the point of indifference between life and death. In Section 5 we
uncover the reason that interpretation is entirely misconceived. That reason also steers us away
from the thought that C  is a poverty line, in the sense the notion has been articulated in suchS
figures as the World Bank's "1.25 dollars-a-day", or even the "two-dollars a day" benchmark.
Every life of poverty represents a bad state of affairs for that individual and makes the entire
population less valuable. C  should be sought in a higher range of figures, possibly a lot higherS
than the World Bank's poverty line. C  is the living standard at which life is neither good nor bad.S
No doubt it is difficult to determine it, but the idea underlying well-being subsistence cannot be
bypassed in population ethics. Identifying C  involves a deep and difficult value judgment.S
4.2 The Sidgwick-Meade Rule
In applying Total Utilitarianism's reasoning to population ethics it is simplest to apply it
first to the Genesis Problem. Genesis is also the scene where Total Utilitarianism doesn't run into
any meaningful trouble. So we imagine Earth to be devoid of people.
Let N be the number to be created. Because marginal well-being declines as the living
standard increases, an equal distribution of K among all who are created is the ideal. If N people
were created each would receive K/N units of the consumption good. Thus C = K/N. Total
Utilitarianism tells us to search for the value of N at which NU(K/N) attains its maximum value.
Routine arguments show that if K is large (N in that case can be regarded as a continuous
variable), optimum N satisfies the condition,
      Dasgupta (1969) assumed that reproducible capital, a fixed quantity of land, and labour15
produce an all-purpose good that can be either consumed or accumulated as (reproducible)
capital. To see what the Sidgwick-Meade Rule looks like when there are production possibilities,
consider a simple version of that model. Suppose output Y is a function of the biosphere (K) and
population (N), so that we may write Y = F(K,N), where F is an increasing function of K and N.
K is fixed by assumption. In the timeless economy C = F(K,N)/N. It is now easy to confirm that
the Sidgwick-Meade Rule is
dU(C)/dC = U(C)/[C - MF/MN] > U(C)/C. (F1)
Compare equation (F1) with equation (1) in the text. The Rule now says that marginal well-being
of consumption exceeds average well-being per unit of consumption. Other things equal the Total
Utilitarian optimum recommends a larger population and a lower living standard in a world
where people are not merely consumers but are producers too, than in a world where they are
mere consumers.   
    
      In his classic work, Harsanyi (1955) built Utilitarianism on the basis of the theory of choice16
under uncertainty.  
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dU(C)/dC = U(C)/C. (1)
Equation (1) says that the solution of the Genesis Problem is a population size at which marginal
well-being equals the ratio of average well-being to average consumption (Figure 1). The
equation is fundamental to Total Utilitarianism. We will call it the Sidgwick-Meade Rule.
The intuition behind the Rule is this:
At the Genesis Ideal neither a small hypothetical increase in population nor a small
hypothetical decrease would alter total well-being. Suppose now a marginal increase is
contemplated. (The argument associated with a marginal decrease is analogous.) The additional
person would share K equally with the population that was originally contemplated. The increase
in total well-being that would obtain if that additional person was created is her well-being,
which is U(C). But there would also be a decrease in total well-being, which is that each of the
others would have slightly less consumption. That potential loss in well-being is C[dU(C)/dC].
At the Genesis Optimum the potential gain and the corresponding potential loss in total well-
being must be equal. The Sidgwick-Meade Rule asserts this. We denote the solution of equation
(1) by C  and the corresponding population size by N . It follows that N  = K/C . N  is the idealO O O O O
population size and C  is the ideal living standard.O 15
4.3 Measurability, Comparability, and the Aggregation of Personal Well-Beings
There is no absolute scale for measuring personal well-being. The theory of choice under
uncertainty, for example, yields a measure that is unique up to positive affine transformations.
iThat says if U  is a measure of individual i's well-being and if á is a positive number and â is a
inumber of either sign, then áU +â is an equally valid measure of i's well-being. Put another way,
ithe ordering of states of affairs represented by U  is the same as the ordering represented by
i iáU +â. In the latter scale á represents the unit and â the level. We say U  in that case is a
"cardinal" measure. Concerned as it is with well-being differences among alternative states of
affairs, the theory does not require the notion of zero well-being.16
      Sen (1970) is the classic on the measurability and interpersonal comparability of individual17
well-beings in fixed populations. By extending his analysis to population ethics, it is easy to
show that dropping full comparability would yield only a partial ordering of population policies.
Partial orderings may be the best that the ethicist can hope for in practice, but no theory of social
ethics should start with partial orderings.    
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Population ethics in contrast requires that lives that go well be distinguished from those
that go badly. A life that goes neither well nor badly scores zero (in Sidgwick's system of ethics
it is the hedonistic zero). Personal well-being is "strongly cardinal" if its measure is unique up
ito positive linear transformations (i.e. proportional transformations). That says if U  is a measure
iof i's well-being and if á is a positive number, then áU  is an equally valid measure of i's well-
being. A population ethic that is derived from Total Utilitarianism requires personal well-being
to be strongly cardinal.
When applying Total Utilitarianism to the Genesis Problem we made an implicit
assumption, that well-beings are fully comparable across individuals. There was no need to
mention it because people were assumed to be identical. In a heterogeneous population the
assumption should be made explicit. Without full comparability of personal well-beings it would
not be possible to construct an ethics with which to derive population policies.17
The idea of full comparability is familiar from weights and measures. The weights of
objects (measured, say, in a vacuum-sealed flask at ground level in a given latitude) are fully
comparable. Suppose we find x to be a heavier object than y. If that is to be a meaningful finding,
the units in which they are measured must be the same; it's no good measuring x in ounces and
y in grams. Reference to grams and ounces tells us that we can say a lot more than merely that
x is heavier than y: we can say how much heavier x is proportionately than y. The reason we can
is that if x is found to be twice as heavy as y using one system of units (ounces), it will be found
to be twice as heavy as y using any other system of units (grams). And that's because an ounce
is proportional to a gram. We can move from one system of units to another with impunity so
long as the corresponding transformations (grams to ounces) are applied consistently.
We can say even more. Because physical theories tell us that addition and subtraction are
legitimate (even required) operations on weights, each scale in the set of admissible scales is
proportional to any other scale in the set, and all scales that are proportional to a scale in the
admissible set are also in the admissible set. Non-linear scales don't belong.
We say personal well-beings are fully comparable if multiplying each individual's well-
being by a constant positive number á is ethically of no significance. Other things equal the Total
Utilitarian would rank the pair of personal well-beings {4,11} above the pair {5,9}, because 15
is bigger than 14. Full comparability says that if we multiply each individual's well-being by a
positive number á, the ranking of the resulting pairs remains the same. They remain the same
because 4á+11á (= 15á) is bigger than 5á+9á (= 14á) for all positive á. The Total Utilitarian can
choose any value of á she likes without compromising her ethics.
      The reverse, much deeper question - on the limits to the forms of aggregation that are18
permitted of personal well-beings when the latter are strongly cardinal and are fully comparable -
was posed and answered in a remarkable work by Blackorby and Donaldson (1982). The showed
that summing personal well-beings is certainly an admissible way to aggregate, but that there are
other forms of aggregation (e.g., summing weighted well-beings).
      If U(C) is replaced by áU(C) in equation (1) and dU(C)/dC by d[áU(C)]/dC, á cancels from19
the two sides. 
      The U-function in equation (2) is unbounded below. In applied work that should be an20
unacceptable feature of the U-function because unboundedness is inconsistent with the theory
of decision under uncertainty (Arrow, 1965). But here we are engaged in theoretical reasoning.
The U-function in equation (2) has the virtue of revealing the structure of Total Utilitarianism
in a very simple manner. 
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Total Utilitarianism aggregates personal well-beings by summing them. The theory
requires personal well-beings to be strongly cardinal and interpersonally fully comparable.  The18
reasoning confirms that the Sidgwick-Meade Rule is invariant with respect to á.  Notice19
moreover that well-being subsistence, C , remains the same under all proportionalS
transformations of the U-function. That's because áU(C ) = 0 for all positive á. In the model weS
used here to study the Genesis Problem, á was set equal to 1 so as not to add another symbol.
4.4 Large Populations Under Total Utilitarianism
Aggregate well-being in Total Utilitarianism is the product of population size (N) and
average well-being (U). Rawls (1972: 162-163) noted that, as shown in Figure 2, the tradeoff
between N and U in the product NU is such that no matter how small is U, so long as it is
positive, a sufficiently large N can compensate for a reduction in U (as long as it remains positive
of course). Parfit (1984: 425-441) found that feature of Total Utilitarianism repugnant. So he
called it the Repugnant Conclusion (RC). Previously Dasgupta (1969) had noted that Total
Utilitarianism commends large populations, in the sense that it advocates population sizes for
which the (optimum) standard of living, C , is only a little above well-being subsistence, C . TheO S
analysis also showed that the larger is the elasticity of marginal well-being with respect to
personal consumption, the lower is the optimum living standard, and that the latter tends in the
limit to the standard of living at which well-being is zero. To reconstruct the argument in the
timeless economy, suppose as in Dasgupta (1969) that
U(C) = B - C , B > 0 and ó > 0. (2)-ó
In equation (2) U(C) is defined by two parameters, B and ó, both of which are positive
numbers (Figure 3). U is an increasing function of C and is bounded above by B. 1+ó (> 1) is the
elasticity of marginal well-being with respect to consumption. Ramsey (1928) named B, Bliss.20
Routine calculations show that on using equation (2) in the Sidgwick-Meade Rule,
C /C  = (1 + ó)  > 1. (3)O S 1/ó
      To confirm equation (3), notice first that C  = B . Next, use equation (2) in the Sidgwick-21 S -1/ó
Meade Rule to show that C  = B (1+ó) . Equation (3) follows immediately. O -1/ó 1/ó
      Ehrlich and Holdren (1971) is the classic that introduced the metaphor, I=PAT, to draw22
attention to the significance of Earth's carrying capacity for population ethics. The authors traced
the impact of human activities on the Earth system to population, affluence (read, the standard
of living), and the character of technology in use (including knowledge, institutions, social
capital). Contemporary demographers have in large measure ignored the Ehrlich-Holdren insight
that nature doesn't calculate percentages (e.g. declines in the rate of growth of population), she
responds to absolute quantities. The notion of Earth's (human) carrying capacity is further
developed in Section 9, where I use international statistics to put flesh into population ethics. 
  
      I owe this observation to Kenneth Arrow.23
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Equation (3) is informative because it relates the optimum living standard to well-being
subsistence.  For population ecologists however, it proves more natural to recast the equation21
in terms of population size. With that in mind define N  = K/C . Because I am thinking of theS S
global economy here, N  can be interpreted as the biosphere's human carrying capacity.S 22
Equation (3) can then be re-expressed as
N /N  = (1 + ó)  > 1. (4)S O 1/ó
Recall now that if ó is positive, (1+ó)  is less than e (the base of natural logarithms),1/ó
which in turn is approximately 2.74. It follows from equations (3)-(4) that
C /C  = N /N  = (1 + ó)  < e . 2.74. (5)O S S O 1/ó
Equation (5) could be taken to say that Total Utilitarianism favours large populations. No
matter how large or small ó happens to be, the optimum living standard is less than 2.74 times
well-being subsistence. The equation also says that carrying capacity is less than 2.74 times the
optimum population size. To illustrate, suppose ó = 1. Then C /C  = N /N  = 2, which means theO S S O
optimum living standard (C ) is twice well-being subsistence, and carrying capacity is twice theO
optimum population size (N ). If the biosphere's carrying capacity is reckoned to be 10 billionO
people, the optimum population size would be 5 billion.
To be sure, the idea of Earth's carrying capacity points to a range, not an exact figure.
Technological advances and improved efficiency in the way resources are used raise the
biosphere's carrying capacity. Moreover, the notion is not independent of ethical values: N  is anS
inverse function of C . The point however is that Earth's life support system is bounded, and NS S
captures that latter fact. That said, whether Total Utilitarianism should be seen to be advocating
overly large populations ("pro-natalist", as some would say) remains unclear. Much hangs on the
standard of living C . Identifying C  involves a value judgement. Once it has been chosen, theS S
factor that remains to determine C  is ó. That means K plays no role in determining the idealO
standard of living. If K was to be larger, Total Utilitarianism would respond by adjusting the
recommended population size N .  This could certainly be seen as an expression of pro-natalism;O 23
      Vital contributions to the modern literature on income inequality measures are Kolm (1969)24
and Atkinson (1970) and to the measurement of risk aversion are Pratt (1964) and Arrow (1965).
Dasgupta (2008) offered reasons why the plausible range of values for ó is (0,2]. Empirical
studies of choice under uncertainty have usually revealed ó to lie in the range (0,1].
      That's because (1+ó)  6 1 as ó 6 4.25 1/ó
      The Repugnant Conclusion initiated a large literature. See for example McMahan (1981),26
Sikora (1981), Hurka (1983), Sterba (1987), Temkin (1987), and Cowen (1989). Huemer (2018)
contains a similar reaction to the Repugnant Conclusion to mine.
There is an economics literature from the first half of the twentieth century that took J.S.
Mill's Average Utilitarianism to be the basis of population ethics (Gottlieb, 1945, is a well-
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but pointing in the opposite direction gives an entirely different impression. Suppose K was to
be smaller. The same feature of equation (2) now says that the adjustment to the ideal would be
made entirely through a reduction in population size; the standard of living would be fully
protected. When applying the theory to global economic statistics in Section 10, I return to this
feature of the calculus of Total Utilitarianism.
1+ó is the percentage rate at which marginal well-being declines in response to a
percentage increase in the living standard. Value pluralists have used 1+ó also as a measure of
the aversion to inequality in the distribution of living standards. When personal well-being is
identified from attitudes to risk in the standard of living, 1+ó is also a measure of a person's risk
aversion.  To obtain a feel for the way 1+ó influences the optimum living standard, we subject24
the Sidgwick-Meade Rule to a full sensitivity analysis. To do that we compute C /C  in equationO S
(5) using alternative values of ó. It will be noticed that to vary ó is to vary well-being subsistence
(equation (2)), but that's an acknowledgement that determining well-being subsistence involves
a value judgment.
How does C  vary in relation to C  as ó assumes different values? Equation (5) says thatO S
the larger is ó, the closer is C /C  (= N /N ) to 1.  If carrying capacity is 10 billion people andO S S O 25
ó is very large, the optimum population size is close to 10 billion. For the value pluralist, strong
social aversion to consumption inequality recommends very large populations. I have known this
result since my student days but still find it puzzling that inequality aversion (respectively, risk
aversion) should play so influential a role in applied population ethics. Admittedly the theory we
are invoking here says that all who are born are to be treated equally; even so, it isn't a priori
obvious why an attitude toward consumption inequality (alternatively, consumption risk) should
so influence the ideal size of population. (Ex post it is obvious of course.)
I have never understood why the large populations that are advocated by Total
Utilitarianism should be found repugnant. So long as well-being is positive, a person's life is
good. Life may not be very good, but it is good. The tradeoff between population size and
average well-being in Total Utilitarianism may not be to everyone's liking, but it is all too
precious to be repelled by it.  The issue isn't a matter of semantics, nor does it hang on any26
known account of the literature). But Average Utilitarianism faces insuperable difficulties. In
place of the Sidgwick-Meade Rule (equation (1)), Average Utilitarianism would recommend a
population of size 1 in our model. 
      Blackorby and Donaldson (1984) proposed that other things equal the creation of an27
additional person should be judged to be good only if her well-being were to exceed a positive,
critical level U  (> 0). The authors called their theory "Critical-Level Utilitarianism". (See alsoC
Blackorby, Bossert, and Donaldson, 1997; and Broome, 2004 (pp. 199-202) for a supportive
account of the theory). U  is not identified from any moral reasoning; its sole purpose wouldC
seem to be to offer an escape from the ubiquitous "Repugnant Conclusion". But there is a basic
problem with the theory. Suppose the well-being of each existing person is expected to be 2U /3.C
As this is a positive number, everyone alive expects a good life. Critical-Level Utilitarianism asks
us to believe that other things equal creating an additional person whose well-being would be
2U /3 is a bad idea. The authors don't explain why it would be a bad idea. I don't see why itC
wouldn't be a good idea. Ng (1986, 1989) is one of the few writers to have insisted that if U is
positive, life is good.
Ingmar Schumacher has suggested in correspondence a possible re-interpretation of the
Blackorby-Donaldson theory. We are to imagine that the authors re-calibrated the personal well-
being function U, so that their U  is the hedonistic zero (i.e. Classical Utilitarianism's U = 0). InC
that interpretation life is bad if U lies in the interval [0,U ) and U = 0 reflects a condition whereC
a person contemplates putting an end to his life. But if Schumacher is right, Critical-Level
Utilitarianism is simply a renumbering of Total Utilitarianism, and that would imply it cannot
act as an antidote to the Repugnant Conclusion.   
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particular notion of well-being. Once the ethicist settles on a figure for well-being subsistence,
she simply has to acknowledge that life is good at any standard of living that exceeds it (the
higher, the better, of course). It is time to retire the Repugnant Conclusion from population
ethics.27
We now study a possible reason Parfit and ethicists following him have found the trade-
off in Sidgwick's Utilitarianism between population size and average well-being to be repugnant.
We will confirm that the reason is based on a misreading of zero well-being.
5 Death
In a moving discourse on the place of autonomy and responsibility in personal well-being,
Williams (1993: 50-102) drew attention to an aspect of personal responsibility that starts not
from what others may demand of someone, but from what that someone demands of himself.
Williams reminded readers that Sophocles had reported that Ajax, being slighted by the award
of Achilles' arms to Odysseus, had intended to kill the leaders of the Greek army. To prevent the
massacre, Athena made Ajax mad. It is significant that Ajax's condition didn't affect his
purposes; rather, it altered his perception. Thinking that he was killing Odysseus and the others,
Ajax slaughtered the army's flock of sheep and cattle. In Sophocles' account the despair arising
      Suicide isn't that rare a phenomenon. Annually over 1 million people take their own life28
worldwide (approximately 1.8 per cent of deaths are suicides) and 20-30 million people attempt
suicide.
      Nagel acknowledges that the loss encountered when someone's life is cut short can't be29
balanced on a one-to-one basis by replacing that someone with a new birth. In my readings on
the subject I have found him (and Narveson, 1967, and Heyd, 1992) to be among the very few
who (at least until recently) acknowledged the asymmetry. Below (Section 6) I make use of the
asymmetry in developing population ethics.
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from the shame Ajax felt on awakening left no option open to him but to take his own life. And
Williams observed (p. 76) that when Ajax says he must go, "... he means that he must go:
period."
Modern ethicists in contrast have frequently offered a view of life that is not only at odds
with Sophocles' account but also with commonly-held notions of life's quality and of the reasons
for the fear and horror that death holds for us. In the chapter that introduces Utilitarianism to his
readers, Sidgwick (1907: 414-415) wrote:
"... I shall assume that, for human beings generally, life on the average yields a positive
balance of pleasure over pain. This has been denied by thoughtful persons: but the denial seems
to me clearly opposed to the common experience of mankind, as expressed in their commonly
accepted principles of action. The great majority of men, in the great majority of conditions under
which human life is lived, certainly act as if death were one of the worst of evils, for themselves
and for those whom they love..."
Nagel (1979) concluded that if death is an evil, it is the loss of life that is objectionable.
The conclusion is incontrovertible to the secular mind, but there are at least three circumstances
of death that should be distinguished, and they don't point in the same direction. There is death
that comes naturally to one in the fullness of time; there is death that comes from natural causes
before one's time; and there is death that is brought on one by one's own deliberate action. Nagel
contrasted the first two, but didn't speak to the third. And it is the latter that should make us pause
before accepting Sidgwick's conclusion that life, all in all, is a positive good for most people.
Religious prohibition, fear of the process of dying (the possibility of suffering pain, the
feeling of isolation), the thought that one would be betraying family and friends, and the deep
resistance to the idea of taking one's own life that has been built into us through selection
pressure would cause someone even in deep misery to balk. It may even be that no matter what
life throws at us we adjust to it, if only to make it possible to carry on.  But the acid test for the28
conclusion that life, all in all, is invariably a good is to ask ourselves whether we shouldn't pause
before creating a person so as to imagine the kind of life that is likely to be in store for the
potential child.  The desire to procreate springs from our deep emotional needs, and the direct29
motivation we have to create children can be traced to a wide variety of reasons (we noted a few
in Section 1), but here we are concerned only with the life of the prospective child.
      Parfit's interpretation of well-being subsistence wouldn't appear to have changed over the30
years. On the Repugnant Conclusion, he has written recently, "Compared with the existence of
many people who would all have some very high quality of life, there is some much larger
number of people whose existence would be better, even though these people would all have
lives that are barely worth living." Parfit (2016: 110).
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The view that life overall is always good have led philosophers to conclusions that should
be unacceptable. In the passage in which he presented the Repugnant Conclusion, Parfit (1984:
388) recognized Total Utilitarianism's pro-natalist character, but then interpreted it in the
following way:
"For any possible population of at least ten billion people, all with a very high quality of
life, there must be some much larger imaginable population whose existence, if other things are
equal, would be better, even though its members have lives that are barely worth living."
One wouldn't question that the image is repugnant, but it belongs nowhere, certainly not
in Total Utilitarianism. We are asked to consider a figure for world population that will almost
certainly be reached in the second half of this century (a figure that is most unlikely to be
sustainable at reasonable material comfort - Section 10), and are then made to imagine an Earth
where, because of population pressure, people scramble for resources so as to eke out an
existence, having lives that are barely worth living.
But someone whose life is barely worth living doesn't enjoy a life of positive quality, she
suffers from negative well-being. In the contemporary world over a half billion people are
malnourished and prone regularly to illness and disease, many of whom are also debt ridden, but
who survive and tenaciously display that their lives are worth living by the fact that they persist
in wishing to live. If you were to say that you would not wish the circumstances they endure on
anyone, I wouldn't take you to mean their lives aren't worth living; I would take you to be saying
that their circumstances are so bad that you wouldn't wish them on even your worst enemy, that
something ought to be done to improve their lives, that if you were to disregard the
countervailing needs you and your household may have, you wouldn't want to create children
facing those circumstances.30
Death relieved the intolerable pain Ajax experienced on awakening from the madness
Athena had inflicted on him. Ajax knew it would, which is why he chose it. It was better for him
that he paid the price of death than that he carried on. The inference Sidgwick drew from the fact
that death is generally thought to be one of the worst evils is altogether unfounded, and I cannot
imagine how so profound and careful a thinker could have made such an elementary arithmetical
error. That death is a horror to most people doesn't imply that life is on balance pleasurable. On
the contrary, the greater is the horror that taking one's own life poses to someone (betrayal of
one's family and friends, revelation of one's misery to others when one wants it to remain
undisclosed even after death), the more he would be willing to carry on in a state of misery. One
way to interpret life in the range between the point at which a person takes his life and well-being
      I owe this interpretation to Robert Solow.31
      To illustrate Sidgwick's error, imagine that in the units chosen to measure U, the horror of32
suicide for someone is -300. The person would choose to continue to live so long life offered her
a value in excess of -300; and that could be as low as -299.99. The presumption that life on
balance is inevitably good (U > 0) or that it is invariably bad (U < 0) precludes reasoned
discussion on population policies. The former commends a large (even infinite) population; the
latter commends an Earth devoid of people. That alone shows that unlike decision theory,
population ethics requires of us to specify the zero of the U-function.
As far as I can tell, numerical measures of subjective well-being have also been taken to
be non-negative in all the large-scale surveys on happiness and life satisfaction that have been
conducted in recent years (see Helliwell, Layard, and Sachs, 2013, for an account of the
findings). It would look as though designers of the questionnaires that have shaped the literature
on empirical hedonism have also been much influenced by the thought that life satisfaction can
never be negative (otherwise why do people continue to want to live?). We do not know whether
people would respond differently to questionnaires on life satisfaction if, instead of a scale from,
say 0 to 10, respondents were offered a scale from -5 to +5.
At the other extreme from Sidgwick is the Chorus in Oedipus at Colonus, who were
reported by Sophocles as having observed: "Not to be born is, past all prizing, best; but, when
a man hath seen the light, this is next best by far, that with all speed he should go thither, whence
he has come." (I am grateful to Kenneth Arrow for this reference. The translation is R.C. Jebb's.)
Daly et al. (2011) have found in one study that a major determinant of suicide is being
at a well-being level significantly lower than others, thus implying that living in a country where
well-being is high is a risk factor for committing suicide. This can be explained if the coefficient
of variation in incomes in two countries, one rich the other poor, is the same and personal well-
being accords with Veblen (1924), that, other things equal U is a decreasing function of the
average living standard relative to a person's own. See Arrow and Dasgupta (2008) for an
analysis of the optimum rate of saving in a world where U is an increasing function not only of
one's own living standard but also her living standard relative to the average living standard of
others in her society. Veblen's observation on human psychology found a telling expression in
a remark attributed to a Garry Feldman of Stamford, Connecticut, one of the wealthiest towns
in the USA: "I might be in the top one per cent, but I feel that I am in the bottom third of the
people I know." (The Guardian, Saturday 16 February 2013).
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subsistence is to view it as bearable but not good. The person would not contemplate suicide, but
could entertain the feeling that it would have been better not to have been born. Zero well-being
is then the transition point from the bearable to the good.  That is why estimating well-being31
subsistence from people's behaviour or responses to questionnaires would be a mistake.32
6 The Problem of Sleeping Beauty
In the Genesis Problem Earth is devoid of people. The domain of discourse consists only
of potential persons. In any Actual Problem Earth is inhabited. The question is whether further
people should be created. The two settings are wildly different.
Consider the problem of Sleeping Beauty. She is alive but in a state of total
unconsciousness (Sidgwick would regard her state to be the hedonistic zero). What makes her
an interesting case for us here is that her life expectation is the prevailing average, in that with
a modicum of medical attention she can be expected to complete the natural lifespan in a state
of total unconsciousness. A small expenditure can however revive her immediately and fully, in
      In his comments on the population problem Seabright (1994) framed parental obligation in33
terms of the parents' notion of "family". He argued that the family has a special place in ethics.
Simon Beard has pointed out to me that the example can be expanded to encompass a
wider range of obligations, for example, if the chooser between X and Y was Sleeping Beauty's
friends (they would have no obligation to make a new friend).  
      Gosseries (2010) has a good discussion of this. He studies the obligations people have34
to one another, not simply parents toward their children. I am ignoring the obligation people may
have (at least to themselves) to procreate in special cases, such as a population at risk of
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which case it is confidently expected her lifetime well-being will be U* (> 0). That's option X for
her parents. Option Y is for them to conceive another child who would enjoy a lifetime well-
being equal to U*. However, under Y Sleeping Beauty will remain unconscious. We suppose that
the couple have no special feelings for Sleeping Beauty. She was born unconscious, so they have
never got to know her. Assume now that in all other respects X and Y have the same
consequences. What should Sleeping Beauty's parents do?
If, as in a literal interpretation of Sidgwick's Utilitarianism, agreeable consciousness is
the sole good and if the fact that something good would be the result of one's action is the basic
reason for doing anything (the ground of binding reason) - the two together yield the principle
of universalizability in ethical reasoning - the couple in question should be indifferent between
X and Y. But there are a number of reasons X should be viewed as the right option. They all
involve constraining the consequentialist reasoning I have been following here with
deontological directives.
6.1 Imperatives
I first list three reasons that have been deployed by philosophers studying problems
similar to that of Sleeping Beauty. I then work with a fourth reason (Section 7), based on Arrow
(1981) and Scheffler (1994). There I borrow the Agent-Based perspective Scheffler constructed
and apply it to population ethics.
Parental Obligation to Sleeping Beauty
X is the right option because Sleeping Beauty's parents have an obligation toward her
which they don't have toward a potential child. They have an obligation toward Sleeping Beauty
because they were responsible for conceiving her. People don't have an obligation to become
parents, but they acquire one if they choose to become parents. It has been argued that parents
have an obligation toward their offspring that no one else has. Parental obligation provides an
argument for choosing X over Y.33
Sleeping Beauty's Claim
Sleeping Beauty has claims over her parents. She is a person, it is her well-being that is
subject to parental choice. She has a claim to be acknowledged by her parents; she has a claim
to be heard by them even though she is unable to speak. The potential child has no comparable
claims.34
extinction from non-fecundity. See Section 11, on existential risks.
      When I first read the passage just quoted, I interpreted it differently. I took Nagel to be35
saying that (invariant) value is so high that no matter how terrible the person's experiences may
be throughout her life, the net value is positive. For the claim to be believable, one must imagine
with Nagel (although Nagel left the thought unsaid) that the value of life for a person, qua life,
is infinite. To me that read odd. I now believe I have interpreted Nagel correctly and am most
grateful to Itai Sher for pointing me in the right direction on this.
      Provided of course that her life will not be of utter misery.36
      It bears emphasis that removing Sleeping Beauty's life support system is not the same as37
killing her. 
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The Value of Sleeping Beauty's Life
Nagel (1979:2) suggested that life has a value to the person living it that is independent
of anything she may experience:
"The situation is roughly this: There are elements which, if added to one's experience,
make life better; there are other elements which, if added to one's experience, make life worse.
But what remains when these are set aside is not merely neutral: it is emphatically positive.
Therefore life is worth living even when the bad elements of experience are plentyful, and the
good ones too meager to outweigh the bad ones on their own. The additional positive weight is
supplied by experience itself, rather than by any of its contents."
I am not sure I understand what Nagel meant, but one interpretation is that life has a value
independent of whether it goes well or badly (it is "supplied by experience itself, rather than by
any of its contents").  Call that stand-alone value, Ù. It sits outside the calculus of well-being.35
When we say life is precious, even sacred, we point to Ù. That life has a stand-alone value Ù is
not a reason for creating a person, but is a reason for awakening Sleeping Beauty even if her life
were predicted not to be one of positive quality.  Ù enters the moral calculus only when it is36
applied to actual persons. Sleeping Beauty is a person, in contrast to an "unborn person", who
is no one. Her parents can, as can others such as the doctors caring for her, point to Ù and require
that she be revived.
6.2 Wider Cases
The problem of Sleeping Beauty gives rise to a number of variations. Suppose X is not
an option. Her parents, or for that matter anyone else, could argue that she should be released
from the indignity of living in coma for the rest of her natural life. In that case they would give
their consent to having her life-support system disconnected.37
Consider now a case where X is not available, but X' is. In X' Sleeping Beauty is revived
at a small cost, but her life will not be good. Even though she will be able to function, she will
suffer from discomfort and pain and will not lead a fulfilling life. All in all it is expected that her
lifetime well-being will be U**, a not-too-large negative number. It can be argued, and
      Arrow (1981) used this reasoning to develop a theory of income distributions arising from38
voluntary contributions. He (personal communication) was moved to construct Agent-Relative
Utilitarianism by the words of the first century sage, Rabbi Hillel: "If I am not for myself, then
who is for me? And if I am not for others, then who am I? And if not now, when?"   
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contemporary sensibilities would favour the argument, that she be revived, on grounds that
Sleeping Beauty should be allowed to exercise her agency, her right to live a life. That's one way
to justify X'.
Consider yet another variation of the problem of Sleeping Beauty. Option Y remains, but
in place of X we are faced with X", which involves reviving Sleeping Beauty with the
understanding that her lifetime well-being will be U*-å, where å is a small positive number.
Assuming their ethical ordering over states of affair is continuous, her parents (or society, more
generally) would choose X" if å was sufficiently small. By continuity, there is a value of å, say
å*, such that it is a matter of ethical indifference to them whether Y is chosen or whether Sleeping
Beauty is revived with the understanding that her lifetime well-being will be U*-å*. To
acknowledge that å* is positive is to say that, other things equal, reviving Sleeping Beauty with
an expectation of U*-å (where 0 < å < å*) would have priority over creating a person with a
lifetime well-being of U*.
And so on. None of these cases is straightforward, but that only shows our intuitions over
birth and death are unsteady. One point however is incontrovertible: A person could regard her
life to be worth living even if she expects it to be one of misery.
6.3 Agent-Centred Restrictions
Scheffler (1994) uncovered agent-centred restrictions that people can justifiably use when
deliberating over courses of action open to them. In a society of N persons those restrictions
would apply reciprocally, meaning that the state of affairs that would ensue would be the
outcome of N choices, each having been being guided by an agent-relative perspective.38
If Sleeping Beauty was a Total Utilitarian and was able to exercise her agency, she would
have faced the dilemma of reconciling the place of the universal others with the demands that her
self requires her to meet when faced with morally significant choices. But Sleeping Beauty is
unable to exercise her agency. So the choice between X and Y requires of others, not just her
parents, to accommodate the agent-centred restrictions that she could justifiably deploy if she
were able to choose. In what follows we study how such restrictions modify Total Utilitarianism.
In the models to follow we are to imagine that each generation reasons collectively. The
agent in each generation is therefore that "generation", not the set of all generations beginning
with that one. Because generations enter sequentially, the agent-centred restrictions we study are
unidirectional, not reciprocal. Moreover, the restrictions are only a weak version of Scheffler's
agent-relativism; they only involve the place of potential well-beings in present people's moral
sensibilities. When applied to Utilitarianism, those restrictions translate to a weighted sum of
      The considerations in Sections 6.1-6.2 don't imply Generation-Relative Utilitarianism, but39
they come close to it. They are also a reminder that the pure consequentialist thinking underlying
Total Utilitarianism requires deontological directives if we are to make sense of ethical dilemmas
in extreme settings, like birth and death. I am grateful to Itai Sher for correspondence on this.
0 1      Obviously, if K/N  was small, the optimum value of N  would be 0.40
      ð corresponds to å* in Section 6.2. Notice that the larger is å*, the smaller is ð.41
V in equation (6) is a direct extension of Total Utilitarianism and would reduce to it if ð
were to be set equal to 1. I have arrived at it by applying Scheffler's reasoning to population
ethics. Value Pluralism in contrast would require the formula to be derived from ethical axioms
on the way individual U-functions are combined to yield a social well-being function V. Welfare
axiomatics does that. Blackorby and Donaldson (1984) applied welfare axiomatics to population
ethics. Their techniques can be adapted to yield equation (6).
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personal well-beings: the weight awarded to potential well-beings is lower than that awarded to
present and future people. We will call that perspective Generation-Relative Utilitarianism.39
7 Actual Problems and Generation-Relative Ethics
I first put the theory to work on the timeless model of Section 4. I then develop the theory
for an economy moving through time.
7.1 Population Ethics in a Timeless World
0The world is inhabited by N  identical people. The total quantity of consumption available
is K. As before, if C is someone's living standard, her well-being is U(C) in the chosen scale. The
question is whether creating further people would make a better world. To have an interesting
0problem, we assume that the world is thinly populated; which is to say, K is large relative to N .
0If they were not to create further people, the well-being of each of the N  persons would be high.
1Suppose an additional N  people are considered. Once they are born they assume the
0status of present people. They would then receive the same consideration as the N  existing
persons.  Straightforward Utilitarian arguments imply that if they were created, the additional40
1 0N  people would share K equally with the N  people who created them. Each person's living
0 1standard would then be K/(N +N ). The backward-induction I have just deployed is essential to
Generation-Relative Utilitarianism.
We assume that the weight awarded to the well-being of present people is taken to be 1
and the weight awarded to the well-being of potential people is ð, where ð is a number between
00 and 1. Denote aggregate well-being as judged by the existing N  people by V. Then
0 0 1 1 0 1V = N U(K/(N +N )) + ðN U(K/(N +N )). (6)
1What we may call an Actual Problem (as opposed to the Genesis Problem) is to choose N  so as
to maximize V in equation (6).  Routine calculations show that under Generation-Relative41
Utilitarianism the reproductive rule that corresponds to the Sidgwick-Meade Rule is
      We are assuming that killing a fraction of the existing population so as to raise the well-42
being of those that remain to positive levels is forbidden.  
      Narveson argued that we are under no obligation to procreate, even if, other things equal,43
it was guaranteed that the person born would have an outstandingly good life. Obligation is a
strong word. In this paper I am exploring a particular way of evaluating states of affair, in which
"well-being" serves as the coin with which states of affair are evaluated. Generation-Relative
Utilitarianism is a lot closer to Total Utilitarianism than Narveson's theory. I have friends
however who regard Generation-Relative Utilitarianism to be infested with ontological elitism.
The criticism comes close to regarding potential persons as actual persons, a view that the
problem of Sleeping Beauty asks us to reject.
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0 1 0 1dU(C)/dC = [ð(N +N )/(N +ðN )][U(C)/C] < U(C)/C. (7)
Equations (1) and (7) say that the optimum standard of living in the Actual Problem (label
it C ) is larger than in the Genesis Problem (C ). That is shown in Figure 4. It follows that theOO O
optimum population size is smaller in an Actual Problem than in the Genesis Problem. The
1smaller is ð, the fewer are the additional numbers (N ) that would be recommended by
Generation-Relative Utilitarianism.
We may put the matter in a slightly more technical, way: There exists ˜  a function N(ð),
0which decreases with ð, such that if N  < N(ð), equation (7) yields the optimum population size.
0But if N  > N(ð), the optimum policy is to not add to the existing population. Personal well-being
0in the latter case is U(K/N ). If the existing population were to have the misfortune of being too
0 0many (N  > N ), the personal well-being of each of the N  individuals would be negative. AndS
that is over-population.42
7.2 Coherence
A morality that requires people to award the same ethical weight to potential and present
people, which is what Total Utilitarianism does, has been questioned by others. Narveson (1967),
for example, had noted difficulties in the requirement and had recast Utilitarianism by observing
that "we (utilitarians) are for making people happy, not for making happy people" (Narveson,
1973: 73). He called his theory Person-Affecting Utilitarianism.43
Parfit (1976) observed that Narveson's theory yields an incoherent notion of goodness.
As his critique would apply equally to Generation-Relative Ethics, here is an example of what
he, and in endorsing the criticism Broome (2004), meant.
We consider individual A and a potential person B, and apply the ceteris paribus clause
on all other people. The prevailing state of affair (or "social state", to use the economist's term),
X, is one where A's well-being is expected to be 11. But A has the option of creating B. Two
social states that include B are possible. In one (we label it Y) A's and B's well-beings would each
be 6. In the other (we label it Z) they would be 8 and 4, respectively. Y and Z differ by way of the
extent to which A and B share resources, a feature of those states of affair that are taken into
account by A when contemplating whether to create B. We re-label X, Y, and Z as {11}, {6,6},
and {8,4}. The problem is to rank them in a situation where A exists but B doesn't. We say that
      Total Utilitarianism and General-Relative Utilitarianism are not the same normative theory.44
The binary relations over social states that are implied by the two are different. We should
therefore distinguish them. Under Total Utilitarianism the social state in which the ethics is
conducted does not matter. The ranking of {X,Y,Z} is the same (Y = Z > X) regardless of whether
B exists. If a temporal structure were imposed on the example, X would not be reachable if either
Y or Z were realized; nevertheless the thought experiment that would give rise to inequalities (8)-
(10) could still be conducted. I am grateful to Simon Beard and Shamik Dasgupta for clarifying
the complexities of the example.
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B, were he to be created, would be of a different generation from A - hence "Generation-Relative
Ethics".
Denote ethical dominance by ">" and ethical equivalence by "=". We imagine A to be a
Generation-Relative Utilitarian. Suppose the weight A awards to the well-being of a potential
person is half the weight awarded to the well-being of an existing person, the latter being set
equal to 1. That means ð = 1/2. It also means that so long as B is a potential person, X > Z > Y.
But if B were born, he would be an actual person. The ethical relation between Y and Z, the only
remaining social states, would then be Y = Z. That's Parfit's criticism.
The trouble with the criticism is that it harks back to the Genesis Problem. As the name
suggests, the Genesis Problem is viewed by someone residing nowhere. That is why Total
Utilitarianism would say Y = Z > X before B is conceived. Parfit took exception to Narveson's
Person-Affecting Utilitarianism because the binary relation between social states is dependent
on whether B is an actual person. Generation-Relative Utilitarianism has that same feature. In
the present example it is A who is evaluating social states. She does that from somewhere, she
is not nowhere.
It is key to Generation-Relative Ethics that the ranking of the three states of affair X, Y,
and Z is a function of the state of affair at which the ranking is arrived at. The perspective is from
the current state. For example, the ethical content of the pair {6,6} in a world where B is only a
potential person differs from the ethical content of the pair {6,6} in a world where B is an actual
person. Denote the ranking of the triplet {X,Y,Z} at X (the social state at which only A is present)
X X Yunder Generation-Relative Utilitarianism by the relationships "> " and "= ", and define ("> ",
Y Z Z"= ") and ("> ", "= "), correspondingly, at Y and Z.
Because A subscribes to Generation-Relative Utilitarianism, she would choose not to add
to the population, because viewed from X,
X X{11} >  {8,4} >  {6,6}. (8)
If A were to view the triplet from Y, however, the ranking would be
Y Y{6,6} =  {8,4} >  {11}, (9)
and from Z, it would be
Z Z{6,6} =  {8,4} >  {11}. (10)
There is no contradiction here. Once X ceases to be an element of the set of possible outcomes
(because B has come into existence), the ranking over Y and Z is reversed.44
      ä describes a Poisson process. We may think of it as reflecting the possibility of a global45
pandemic, uninfluenced by policy. Rees (2003) offers an assessment of the likelihood of such a
global disaster.  
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8 Population Ethics Across the Generations
The "preference reversal" displayed in inequalities (8)-(10) translates to "intergenerational
inconsistency", in that each generation's ordering over possible future worlds differs from those
of future generations over the possible future worlds they in  turn face. But as we confirm below,
it is possible for the generations to arrive at choices that are consistent with one another's
perspective. We now confirm how each generation would be able both to influence and affirm
the choices to be made by those that are to follow. We do that by building on the timeless model
we have just studied to construct a world moving through time.
8.1 The Model
Time is divided into periods and is denoted by t (t = 0,1,...). The horizon is indefinite, but
there is a positive risk of extinction of the human race at t should it have survived until then. That
rate is taken to be a constant, ä (> 0). ä operates like a constant time discount rate. Define è =
1/(1+ä). è assumes the role of a "time discount factor". I imagine that other than humanity's
survival there is no future uncertainty.45
It is imperative to distinguish stocks from flows in economies moving through time.
Flows are the rates at which stocks change with time. For starkness we imagine the global
economy and regard K to denote Nature. K is a stock, measured, say in units of biomass. To
retain the parsimony of the timeless economy, we are to imagine that people are pure consumers,
they themselves do not engage in production activities (but see the Appendix) and have no
possibility of investing or dis-investing. Nature is assumed to do all the producing, providing
humanity with a flow of a non-storable, all-purpose consumption good, of amount F(K).
We assume that Nature isn't mishandled, meaning that K does not decline. I realize the
latter assumption is a stretch, but I am trying to uncover the optimum population and
consumption policy for the economy. It would make no sense to imagine that the economy's
institutions are in a bad shape. Even otherwise the model is sensible. For example, in not
allowing for the possibility of capital accumulation, the model encourages us to focus on the
limits set by Nature: K captures environmental constraints. Mismanaging Nature would amount
to reducing K. I elaborate on F(K) in Section 9-10 when putting the theory to work on data on
Nature's capacity to offer humanity with a flow of ecological services.
People live for two periods. In their first period (childhood) they are maintained by their
parents. At the beginning of their second period (adulthood) - should humanity survive until then
- they choose how many children to have and how to share F(K) among themselves and their
children. The way I have phrased matters could suggest that the society we are studying is
      The discount factor è reflects the risk of extinction in each period. There are other reasons46
one could offer for intergenerational discounting. The classic on this is Koopmans (1960, 1972).
Dasgupta (2004, 2012) and Kelleher (2016) construct the philosophical underpinnings of those
other reasons. I am taking a minimalist view here, by regarding the risk of extinction as the sole
reason for discounting future well-beings. 
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authoritarian and centralized. It isn't. Rather, we suppose people of the same generation are
identical and that adults in any period have the same ethical motivation. So, even though it is
individuals who do the choosing, we may speak as though each generation chooses the size of
the next generation. Agent-based restrictions on choice translate here into generation-based
restrictions.
People die at the end of their second period. There are thus two generations of people in
any period. This is not good demography, but it turns out not to matter. To include realistic
demographic features would not add to the substance of population ethics.
Let N(t) be the number of adults at t, should the world survive until then. I will call them
"generation-t". The number of children they choose to have is N(t+1). The two generations at t
make a total population of N(t)+N(t+1), sharing F(K). In period t+1, assuming the world survives,
the N(t+1) children of the previous generation are adults (they constitute generation-(t+1)); and
if they give birth to N(t+2) children, they share F(K) with them. And so on.
Personal well-being is a function of her consumption level. Adults and children have the
same well-being function, U(C), and U has the same technical properties as in the timeless model
we studied previously. It follows that generation-t has two choices to make: the size of the next
generation (N(t+1)) and the basis on which to share F(K) with them. In view of the properties of
the U-function we have assumed, the latter choice is simple enough: parents share their resources
equally with their children. Let C(t) denote an individual's rate of consumption at t. Then C(t) =
F(K)/(N(t)+N(t+1)). That's backward induction, a pre-requisite in Generation-Relative
Utilitarianism.
The normative criterion each generation adopts for choosing the size of their family is
"intergenerational well-being". How would Total Utilitarianism give expression to the notion?
Here is Sidgwick (1907: 414) on the matter:
"It seems ... clear that the time at which a man exists cannot affect the value of his
happiness from the universal point of view; and that the interests of posterity must concern a
Utilitarian as much as those of his contemporaries, except in so far as the effect of his actions on
posterity - and even the existence of human beings to be affected - must necessarily be more
uncertain." (Italics added)
Let V(t) denote intergenerational well-being as judged by generation-t. Total
Utilitarianism regards V(t) to be the (expected) sum of each person's well-being, from t into the
indefinite future; and that is
s=t' [N(s)U(F(K)/(N(s)+N(s+1)))è ].4 (s-t) 46
s=t+1      " ' " denotes summation from t+1 to infinity. Notice that equation (11) reduces to47 4
equation (6) in the timeless model if there is no period following t. In that case only the first two
terms in the right hand side of equation (11) remain. But that's equation (6).  
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Generation-Relative Utilitarianism in contrast judges V(t) to be a weighted value of the
expected sum of personal well-beings. The theory awards a weight ð (< 1) to potential well-
beings regardless of the date of arrival of potential people.
Because the economy has a stationary structure, generation-t can reason that future
generations will have a motivation very much like theirs. It follows that
s=t+1V(t) = N(t)U(F(K)/(N(t)+N(t+1))) + ðN(t+1)U(F(K)/(N(t)+N(t+1))) + ð{ ' [è4 (s-
[N(s)U(F(K)/N(s)+N(s+1)) + N(s+1)U(F(K)/N(s)+N(s+1))]},t)
0 < ð, è < 1 and t = 0,1,.... (11)
The present is taken to be t = 0.47
V(t) guides the choices of generation-t, for all t $ 0. Generation-0 is N(0) in number. So
N(0) is given. If previous generations hadn't been moved by Generation-Relative Utilitarianism,
the population size at t = 0 would not have been chosen with that theory as their guide. No doubt
generation-0 will want to ask what their ancestors' intentions had been, and feel obliged to choose
so as not to be entirely at variance with them; but those considerations would be a distraction
here. So I assume that generation-0 regards the past to be past. They are entirely forward looking.
Equation (11) binds members of generation-t to their descendants. As all generations from t =
0 onward adhere to Generation-Relative Utilitarianism, equation (11) is taken to bind members
of all generations to their descendants.
8.2 Intergenerational Consistency
The analysis that follows is informal. Beyond supposing that N(0) is small relative to K
(otherwise generation-0 will choose not to reproduce), I avoid technicalities.
Consider an arbitrary t (t $ 0). N(t) will have been chosen by the previous generation.
That means N(t) will not be subject to choice at t. But N(t+1) will be subject to choice by
generation-t, comprising N(t) people. It could seem that the optimum population numbers - from
t onward - are those that together maximize V(t). But there are two problems with that thought;
one practical, the other ethical. The practical problem has to do with implementation. Generation-
t has no means of enforcing its will on future generations. Moreover, later generations will have
every incentive not to procreate in accordance with generation-t's bidding. Because ð < 1, their
grounds of binding reason will differ from that of generation-t, and in turn from those of one
another. That's intergenerational inconsistency.
Turning to the ethical matter, it can be argued that generation-t would have no right to
enforce its will on future generations even if a method was found to enforce it. Consider then a
future generation, say, s (s > t). Intergenerational well-being as viewed by generation-s will be
V(s), and V(s) is the ground of binding reason for generation-s. An ideal population profile under
      {N*(1),...,N*(t+1),...} is an intergenerational Nash equilibrium.48
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Generation-Relative Utilitarianism is therefore a sequence of reproductive choices
{N*(1),...,N*(t), N*(t+1),...} with the property that N*(t+1) maximizes V(t) on the supposition
that all generations following t will choose in accordance with that sequence. That common
supposition has the status of an implicit understanding among the generations. Because each
generation has an understanding of the choices its descendants will face (assuming there will be
descendants!), it can anticipate the choices they will make. Its own choice is based on a forecast
of its descendants' choices. That said, the exercise isn't exclusively forward looking. Each
generation looks back at the choices their ancestors had made, if only to reassure itself of the
implicit understanding and confirm that its own choice is guided by it. The population sequence
{N*(1),...,N*(t+1),...} is intergenerationally consistent, even though the ethical motivations of
the generations are not consistent with one another.48
8.3 Extreme Theories
Total Utilitarianism represents one extreme set of values. At the other extreme is a theory
that is easy to describe but is also questionable. It involves the thought that no weight should be
awarded to potential well-beings. The viewpoint was explored by Enke (1966) in his study of
social cost-benefit analysis of family planning programmes in poor countries. Enke sought ways
to measure the economic value of prevented births, which he took to be the discounted sum of
the differences between an additional person's consumption and the person's output over his
lifetime. Children in Enke's theory have value only if they pay their way. In our formal model
Enke's theory would amount to setting ð equal to zero.
But Enke's is an extreme point of view, as is Total Utilitarianism: one awards no weight
to potential well-being; the other awards the same weight to potential well-being as it does to the
well-being of present or future people. We have reasons to reject both. Generation-Relative
Utilitarianism lies between two extremes and reflects the strength of each without giving in to
the weaknesses of either. It prescribes neither a large population nor a small population. Instead,
it offers a wide space in between, within which more detailed ethical considerations can be
embedded. We should not expect an ethical theory to do more.
8.4 The Stationary Optimum
Characterizing the implicit understanding among the generations for arbitrary values of
N(0) is hard work. So we study the understanding that supports a stationary profile. Along a
stationary profile (we confirm presently that it is unique) the generations replicate their numbers.
Imagine that N* is that common number.
The idea underlying {N*,N*,...} can be expressed in the following way: If N(0) happens
to equal N*, replication would be the optimum choice of every generation if they were to suppose
that all subsequent generations will in turn replicate their numbers. N* is then a self-enforcing
      If U satisfies equation (2), the stationary N*-profile is locally stable. That's the ultimate49
justification for studying the stationary profile.
      To confirm that, we open up equation (11) and write it as50
V(t) = N(t)U(K/(N(t)+N(t+1))) + ðN(t+1)U(K/(N(t)+N(t+1))) + ðèU(K/(N(t+1)+N(t+2)))
+ ðèU(K/(N(t+1)+N(t+2)) + ..., 0 < ð, è < 1.
As previously we suppose that N(t+1) is a continuous variable. Differentiating V(t) with
respect to N(t+1), setting the derivative equal to zero, and assuming that N(t) = N(t+1) = N at all
t yields equation (12). 
      Equation (14) is the stationary equilibrium of a "game" involving the generations that are51
born. Each generation chooses the size of the generation that is to follow. Equation (11)
summarizes the motivation of generation t, and by recursion the motivation of all generations that
follow t. In more realistic models of individual life cycles parents' ethical motivations will not
remain the same as and when they bear children. For example, adults in the world we know live
for more than one period and choose the number of children they have sequentially. A simple
exercise with Generation-Relative Utilitarianism confirms that a parent's ethical motivation
before the birth of the first child differs from the motivation she would have after the birth of the
first child. In Section 7.2 it was noted that the theory is constructed out of the view that the
ethical ordering of states of affair isn't constructed from nowhere, but can depend on the state of
affairs from which the ordering is constructed.
Shifting ethical perspectives were explored by Phelps and Pollak (1968), who studied
savings behaviour in a world that is committed to Generation-Relative Utilitarianism but where
future population sizes are not a matter choice. One consequence they drew is that the stationary
equilibrium of their "savings game", where each generation chooses a saving rate, is inter-
generationally inefficient; that is, there exists a feasible saving policy, one for each generation,
that would result in an outcome where the level of well-being of every generation would be
higher. (The superior saving policy would not be an equilibrium, however.) It would be
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reproductive policy for every generation. The understanding that implements the policy in
question is only implicit of course. But because N* is a self-enforcing choice for each generation,
there is no call for a constitutional directive. We now identify the equation the population
sequence {N*,N*,... } must satisfy.49
In each period there are N* adults and N* children, making a total population of 2N*. In
each period each person consumes F(K)/2N* units of the consumption good. Write C* =
F(K)/2N*. It is now simple to show that C* (correspondingly N*) is the solution of the
equation,50
dU(C)/dC = [2ð(1+è)/(1+ð+2ðè)]U(C)/C. (12)
Define
P = 2ð(1+è)/(1+ð+2ðè). (13)
Equation (12) can then be re-written in the compact form
U(C)/dC = PU(C)/C. (14)
P represents the proportionate gap between marginal well-being and the average well-being per
unit of consumption. The smaller is P, the greater is that gap. It is easy to confirm that P # 1.
Equation (14) is fundamental to our analysis here and extends Generation-Relative
Utilitarianism beyond the timeless world (equation (7)) to cover one that moves through time.51
reasonable to imagine though that once the generations in the Phelps-Pollak world come to
realize that the saving policy they are pursuing is inefficient, they would want to enrich the space
of strategies from which they choose. Instead of choosing a saving rate (which is a number), each
generation could in principle choose from saving policies (saving rates as functions of inherited
wealth). Saving rates in equilibrium would then be the rates that are implied by equilibrium
saving policies. Such a move can create equilibria that are efficient (Dasgupta, 1974b). I have not
investigated how that move would work in the population problem.
                
      Ehrlich and Goulder (2007) has a fine discussion of this.52
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9 Earth's Carrying Capacity
Our intertemporal model has no production, no technological change, more broadly none
of the pathways humanity has used to better ourselves over the millennia. That demands
justification.
In Dasgupta (1969) Total Utilitarianism was studied in a model economy in which labour,
accumulated capital, and a fixed quantity of land (for which read, "biosphere") produces output.
But even if discoveries and new ideas were added to the list of factors, substitution possibilities
between the produced factors and the biosphere would be increasingly limited if the latter were
to dwindle in extent and quality.  The model in Dasgupta (1969) assumed considerable52
substitution possibilities (the elasticity of substitution was assumed to be 1). Nevertheless the
finiteness of land was found to be a biting constraint. The average living standard and population
size under Total Utilitarianism were shown to tend in the long run to finite levels. The simple
consumption model I am using here mimics that feature.
9.1 The Biosphere as a Renewable Natural Resource
We are to imagine biosphere as a renewable natural resource (K), producing a flow of
ecological services (F(K)), measured say in units of biomass. That amounts to a huge aggregation
exercise, for Nature is a mosaic of degradable assets. Mismanagement of it amounts to reductions
in K even when K is small relative to human needs. Agricultural land, forests, watersheds,
fisheries, fresh water sources, estuaries, wetlands, the atmosphere - more generally, ecosystems -
are assets that are self-regenerative, but can suffer from deterioration or depletion because of
human encroachment. In a fundamental work on the state of the world's ecosystems, MEA
(2005a-d) classified them in terms of the services they provide. The publications offered a four-
way classification of ecosystem services: (i) provisioning services (food, fibre, fuel, fresh water);
(ii) regulating services (protection against natural hazards such as storms; the climate system);
(iii) supporting services (nutrient cycling, soil production); and (iv) cultural services (recreation,
cultural landscapes, aesthetic or spiritual experiences). Notice that cultural services and a variety
of regulating services (such as disease regulation) contribute directly to human well-being,
whereas others (soil production) contribute indirectly (by providing the means of growing food
      Ecosystems combine the a-biotic environment with communities of plants, animals, fungi,53
and microorganisms to form functional units. The individual actors in an ecosystem include
organisms that pollinate, decompose, filter, transport, re-distribute, scavenge, fix gases, and so
on. Their activities enable ecosystems to maintain a genetic library, preserve and regenerate soil,
fix nitrogen and carbon, recycle nutrients, control floods, mitigate droughts, filter pollutants,
assimilate waste, pollinate crops, operate the hydrological cycle, and maintain the gaseous
composition of the atmosphere. Among the visible products of ecosystems are food, fibres, fuel,
and fresh water; but many of the products remain hidden from view.
      A tractable form of F(K), in wide use among ecologists for a wide variety of ecosystems,54
is quadratic:
F(K) = rK(1 - K/K*), where r and K* are positive constants.
In this equation r is the "intrinsic growth rate" of K (because r at small values of K is the
percentage rate of growth of K) and K* is the system's carrying capacity (because F(K*) = 0).
The view that the biosphere is a renewable natural resource covers pollution as well (e.g.
contemporary carbon emissions into the atmosphere). Pollutants are the reverse of natural
resources. One way to conceptualize pollution is to view it as the depreciation of capital assets.
Acid rains damage forests; carbon emissions into the atmosphere trap heat; industrial seepage
and discharge reduce water quality in streams and underground reservoirs; sulfur emissions
corrode structures and harm human health; and so on. The damage inflicted on each type of asset
(buildings, forests, the atmosphere, fisheries, human health) should be interpreted as
depreciation. For natural resources depreciation amounts to the difference between the aggregate
rate at which it is harvested and its natural regenerative rate; for pollutants the depreciation they
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crops).53
To imagine the biosphere as a renewable natural resource requires facing a further
problem. Even two thousand years ago, when global population was under 250 million and per
capita income a bit over a dollar a day, it would have been a reasonable approximation to treat
humanity as a separate entity from the biosphere. Today it is no longer possible to do so. We are
much engaged in transforming the biosphere, by both creating biomass and destroying it. So we
have to imagine humanity as at once a constituent of the biosphere and an entity separate from
it. No doubt that's a stretch, but it is possible to do it without running into contradictions. We
avoid contradiction by noting that a portion of F(K), say á, is needed for the maintenance of the
biosphere. So, if over a period of time F(K) was to be usurped entirely by humanity, K would
shrink and biodiversity would be reduced. If during an interval of time humanity was to consume
even more than F(K), K would shrink even more, further drawing down biodiversity. Humanity
is doing that now, which is what has led Wilson (2016) to propose that we should leave half the
biosphere (designed as a connected region) alone; that is, set á equal to 0.5. (1-á)F(K) should
therefore be interpreted as the useable flow of biomass; useable, that is, by humanity.
It could be thought that F(K) must be an increasing function of K for all values of K; but
that would be to overlook that Earth is finite in extent. F should therefore be taken to be an
increasing function of K for small values of K, but a declining function of K for large values of
K. Earth's "carrying capacity" for the prevailing life-forms - a formidable notion in itself, but one
that cannot be avoided - is that positive value of K at which F(K) is zero.54
inflict on natural resources is the difference between the rate at which pollutants are discharged
into the resource-base and the rate at which the resource-base is able to neutralize it. The task in
either case is to estimate those depreciations. It follows that there is no reason to distinguish the
analytical structure of resource management problems from pollution management problems.
Roughly speaking, "resources" are "goods", while "pollutants" (the degrader of resources) are
"bads". Pollution is the reverse of conservation.
      The term "Anthropocene" was popularized by Crutzen and Stoermer (2000) to mark a new55
epoch that began with the Industrial Revolution some 250 years ago. Wilson (1992, 2016) are
two authoritative accounts of the value of bio-diversity and its precipitous decline over the past
century.       
32
Humanity's success in raising the standard of living over the past 250 years has in great
measure involved mining and degrading K. That has usually gone unrecorded in official
economic statistics, but we know now that even while industrial output increased by a multiple
of 40 during the 20th century, the use of energy increased by a multiple of 16, methane-producing
cattle population grew in pace with human population, fish catch increased by a multiple of 35
and carbon and sulphur dioxide emissions rose by more than 10. The application of nitrogen to
the terrestrial environment from the use of fertilizers, fossil fuels, and leguminous crops is now
at least as great as that from all natural sources combined. Soil nitrogen and phosphorus
inventories have doubled over the past century (nitrate levels in Greenland ice are today higher
than at any time in the previous 100,000 years), and 40-45 per cent of the 45-60 billion metric
tons of carbon harnessed annually by terrestrial photosynthesis is now appropriated for human
use (Vitousek et al., 1986, 1997). Extinction rates of species since the early modern era have been
far above background rates and have increased a lot further since the 19th century (RSPB et al.,
2013).
Although the rise in the concentration of atmospheric carbon receives much the greater
public attention today, the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MEA, 2005a-d) reported that 15
of the 24 ecosystems the authors had investigated world-wide are either degraded or are being
exploited at unsustainable rates. Population pressure on the land in use and habitat destruction
that accompanies human encroachment are the proximate causes. The figures put the scale of
humanity's presence on the planet in perspective and record that we are now Earth's dominant
species (Ehrlich and Ehrlich, 2008). The statistics also explain why our epoch has now been
renamed the Anthropocene.  These all point to rates of biomass transformation in excess of the55
useable flux, (1-á)F. Consequently, they point to reductions in K.
9.2 Ecological Footprint
Studying biogeochemical signatures of the past 11,000 years, Waters, Zalasiewicz,
Summerhayes et al. (2016) have provided a revealing sketch of the Anthropocene. The authors
noted that a sharp increase took place in the middle of the 20th century in the rate of deterioration
in the workings of Earth's life support system. They proposed that mid-20th Century should be
      The Anthropocene Working Group has recently proposed that the immediate post-war years56
should be regarded as the start of the Anthropocene. See Vosen (2016).  
      For pioneering work on the idea of ecological footprints, see Rees and Wackernagel (1994)57
and Rees (2001, 2006). See also Kitzes et al. (2008). Wakernagel, who founded the Global
Footprint Network (www.footprintnetwork.org/public), was a lead author of WWF (2008).    
33
regarded as the time we entered the Anthropocene.56
Their reading is consistent with macroeconomic statistics. World population in 1950 was
2.5 billion. Global GDP was a bit over 5 trillion dollars (PPP). The average person in the world
was poor, with an annual income of a bit over 2,000 dollars (PPP). Since then the world has
prospered materially beyond recognition. World income per capita today is 15,000 dollars (PPP)
and population has increased to 7.3 billion. World output of final goods and services today is
about 108 trillion dollars (PPP), which helps to explain not only the stresses to the Earth system
that we have just reviewed, but also hints at the possibility (one that we confirm below using
crude data) that humanity's extraction of biomass has for some time exceeded sustainable levels
((1-á)F).
In a review of the state of the Earth's life support system, WWF (2008) reported that in
the early years of this century, humanity's demand for ecological services exceeded by 50 per cent
the rate at which the biosphere is able to supply those services to us. The figure is based on the
idea of "global ecological footprint", which is the surface area of biologically productive land and
sea needed to supply the resources a human population consumes (food, fibres, wood, water) and
to assimilate the waste it produces (materials, gases). The Global Footprint Network (GFN)
regularly updates their estimates of the global ecological footprint.  A footprint in excess of 157
means demand for ecological services exceeds their supply. That means to maintain the world's
average living standard (roughly 12,000 international dollars in the early 2000s), we would have
needed 1.5 Earths. This is, to be sure, a very, very rough figure; but they are the only estimates
we have to date to work with. Ecology continues to be a vastly underfunded discipline.
GFN's most recent estimate is a footprint of a bit over 1.6, which in our terminology
means humanity has in recent years been consuming ecological services at the rate 1.6(1-á)F(K).
Humanity's demand for ecological services can exceed supply for a period, but not indefinitely.
Our model would interpret a footprint in excess of 1 as a decline in K (i.e. ÄK < 0). Sustainable
development would require that the footprint over time must on average equal 1. To be sure,
F(K) can be made to increase by measures that reduce the footprint to less than 1. For example,
advances in bio-technology are designed to increase F(K), but the advances would be successful
only if they don't have large, unintended adverse consequences on the biosphere. Moreover,
irreversible losses, arising say from biological extinctions, would act as constraints on the
biosphere's ability to recover. That said, moves toward consumption and production practices that
      The case "è = 1" requires comment because V(t) in that case is unbounded. In a classic paper58
Koopmans (1965) discovered a way to re-formulate the idea of optimum intergenerational well-
being so as to overcome the problem (economists call the revised formulation the "overtaking
criterion" of optimality). Koopmans' suggestion works here as well.         
      è is pertinent to the case P < 1; it influences N*. 59
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make smaller demands on the biosphere would be a more direct approach to reducing our impact
on the Earth system.
Our model errs in regarding F(K) to be constant over time. Because my aim here is to
study Generation-Relative Utilitarianism in a world with no institutional imperfections, we are
to imagine that human institutions are strong enough to prevent the ecological footprint from
exceeding 1. To determine what Generation-Relative Utilitarianism prescribes in a world where
the footprint exceeds 1 we would need to reduce K, estimate F(K) at the reduced value of K, and
re-compute N*, and thereby C*. That's the route I take below and, to reduce notation, assume that
á = 0.
10 Quantitative Estimates of Optimum Population
Equation (13) says that P = 1 if ð = 1. But if P = 1, equation (14) reduces to the Sidgwick-
Meade Rule (equation (1)). That is so no matter what è happens to be. The reason for the latter
is simple: Because there is no production in the economy, the optimum policy in each period is
independent of the risk of extinction.58
Equation (13) also says that P < 1 if ð < 1. But P < 1 implies dU(C)/dC < U(C)/C.
Personal well-being is greater under Generation-Relative Utilitarianism than under Classical
Utilitarianism. Correspondingly, population is smaller.59
By how much? To investigate, we consider once again the U-function in equation (2).
Well-being subsistence is C  = B  and the system's carrying capacity is 2N  = F(K)/C .S -1/ó S S
Equations (13)-(14) say that if C* is the optimum stationary living standard, then
C*/C  = N /2N* = [(ó + P)/P]  > 1. (15)S S 1/ó
Equation (15) is the basis on which we can test Generation-Relative Utilitarianism.
It is interesting that C* does not depend on F(K); it depends only on the (ethical)
parameters ð and C . But N  is a function of C  and F(K), and equation (15) says that N /N* isS S S S
independent of F(K). That has important consequences for demographic and economic policy.
Suppose it is found that F(K) is lower that what it was previously thought to be. Generation-
Relative Utilitarianism says that C* should be fully protected and that the entire adjustment
should be borne by the population size. The theory recommends that N* is reduced in proportion
to the decline in F(K).
We now estimate C* and N* by putting equation (15) to work on contemporary global
statistics.
10.1 Critical Parameters
      I have set ó = 1 for computational ease.60
      I am grateful to Robert Solow for drawing my attention to the significance of relative61
consumption for well-being subsistence.
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The stumbling block proves to be C  and P.  Of the pair, P is possibly the lessS 60
problematic. One can imagine P being estimated from surveys on fertility intentions at the level
of the household. No doubt household behaviour is not the exclusive source of moral facts
(Section 1 drew attention to a number of reasons why), but it would be impudent (not to say
authoritarian) to ignore household intentions altogether in reaching ethical directives.
The sticking point will almost certainly be C . Matters aren't helped by the fact that CS S
has been misinterpreted for over a century. Identifying C  involves a value judgment, but it is alsoS
embedded in cultural presumptions. To make matters even more problematic, C  is politicallyS
sensitive. The latter problem would be eased if we were able to relate C  to politically acceptableS
parameters such as absolute poverty lines (e.g. the World Bank's "1.25 dollars-a-day", or the
institution's bolder criterion, "2 dollars-a-day"). The analysis of Section 5 showed however that
no such relationship exists. A correct reading of C  says that it is a lot higher than what peopleS
today judge to be an absolute poverty line. An alternative would be to regard relative poverty as
a surrogate for C . It could appear odd that well-being subsistence depends on a society's averageS
level of income and is an increasing function of it; but as we noted previously, there is much
evidence that personal well-being depends in part on our own standard of living when compared
to the living standard of others in our peer group.61
The sad truth is that population ethics has been so comprehensively neglected in the
social sciences that we have developed no informed intuition about either C  or P. EconomistsS
and decision theorists have identified reasons for commending that ó should be in the range (0,1],
they have devised techniques for estimating income inequality, social discount rates, the cost of
carbon in the atmosphere, and identifying both absolute and relative poverty lines; but on ethical
parameters that are crucial to population ethics, we have developed little intuition.
10.2 Sensitivity Analysis
Sensitivity analysis is about the best we can do today. But sensitivity analysis alone is not
helpful. It informs but doesn't tell us how to proceed from there. One thought is to iterate: (i) start
with an arbitrary pair of figures for C  and P and derive C* and N*; (ii) revise the figures andS
estimate the corresponding C* and N*; (iii) continue doing so until the evaluator reaches what
Rawls would call a "reflective equilibrium" regarding C* and N*. Of course, a pair of figures for
C* and N* that "feel" right may still be very wrong; but we would then want to know why they
are wrong. That would force us to think on the matter and engage in discussions with others.
For simplicity of calculation, I suppose ó = è = 1. To illustrate sensitivity analysis, I
consider three sets of figures for C  and ð (the latter yields P) and deduce the C* and N* that areS
      International dollars are a fictitious currency that evens out differences in the cost of living62
across countries. International dollars are often expressed as dollars adjusted for purchasing
power parity (PPP). In what follows I drop the qualifier and use the term "dollar".       
      To confirm the latter, set è = ó = ð = 1 in equation (14). It could appear odd that Classical63
Utilitarianism advocates both smaller population and lower living standard than is the case in the
contemporary world, but recall that our calculations pertain to a sustainable Earth (K). At a world
GDP of 108 trillion dollars humanity's living standard is not sustainable.
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implied by each pair. I start with "large" figures for C  and ð and reduce them in steps.S
We first need an estimate for F(K). Consider the world as a whole. Annual global income
today is about 108 trillion international dollars.  Even though GFN's most recent estimate of the62
ecological footprint is 1.6, I use the conservative figure of 1.5. Making the simplifying
assumption that GDP draws proportionately on ecosystem services at all levels, we conclude that
the sustainable level of annual world income is 72 trillion (2x108/3 trillion) dollars. That gives
us F(K).
We now study three illustrative cases:
(1) Suppose ð = 0.1. Then P . 0.325 and (ó+P)/P . 4. Now suppose C  = 7,200 dollars,S
which is approximately Guatemala's per capita GDP. It follows that N  = 10 billion (72S
trillion/7.2 thousand). Now use equation (14) to confirm that 2N* = 2.5 billion and C* = 28,800
dollars. The latter figure is the per capita GDP of Portugal. Total Utilitarianism (ð = 1) in contrast
would arrive at a figure that is half as much (14,400 dollars) and a population size that is twice
as much (5 billion). For easy comparison, I note that world population today is 7.2 billion and
average world income per person is 15,000 dollars.63
(2) Suppose ð = 0.05. Then P . 0.18 and (ó+P)/P . 6.5. Now suppose C  = 6,000 dollars,S
which is roughly the per capita GDP of the Republic of Congo today. Then N  = 12 billion (72S
trillion/6 thousand). We can now use equation (14) to confirm that 2N* = 1.85 billion and C* =
39,000 dollars. The latter figure is the per capita GDP of France. In contrast Classical
Utilitarianism would advocate a population of 6 billion, enjoying a living standard of 12,000
dollars.
(3) Suppose ð = 0.01. Then P . 0.04 and (ó+P)/P = 26. Now suppose C  = 1,000 dollars,S
which is just a bit over the per capita GDP of Niger - one of the world's poorest countries. Then
N  = 72 billion (72 trillion/1 thousand); and so 2N* = 2.8 billion and C* = 26,000 dollars. TheS
latter is a bit above per capita GDP in Greece. In contrast Classical Utilitarianism would advocate
a population of 36 billion at a standard of living of 2,000 dollars.
Although three exercises can't reveal much, they reveal that Generation-Relative
Utilitarianism is most distinct from Classical Utilitarianism when ð is small (and thereby P is
small) and simultaneously C  is small. I expected the former but didn't expect it would come tiedS
to the latter.
11 Existential Risks and Rational Ends
      Sikora (1978) is an early exploration for a response to the question using Classical64
Utilitarianism as the guide.  
      In a wide-ranging discussion of the ethical implications of global extinction Scheffler65
(2013) has also observed that our own lives would be diminished if there were to be no future
people. 
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In a deep meditation on the significance of a possible nuclear holocaust in which
humanity suffers extinction, the late Jonathan Schell distinguished two types of death:
"It is of the essence of the human condition that we are born, live for a while, and then
die... But although the untimely death of everyone in the world would in itself be an
unimaginably huge loss, it would bring with it a separate, distinct loss that would be in a sense
even huger - the cancellation of all future generations of human beings." (Schell, 1982: 114-115)
Schell's book was originally published as a three-part essay in The New Yorker in 1981,
at a time the Cold War had created an especial chill. Schell was a writer, not a professional
philosopher, but he made not one false move in philosophical reasoning in the crucial middle
chapter, Second Death. Both Total Utilitarianism and Generation-Relative Utilitarianism measure
the loss from the Second Death in terms of the well-being of all who would not exist on account
of human extinction. In the previous section we saw how those losses could be estimated.64
Schell however made a radically different move. He spoke of the loss each of us alive today
would suffer if we were to discover that there will be no one after we are gone. He located that
loss not to any attachment we may have to humanity writ large, but to a devaluation of our own
lives. And he used the artist and his art to make the point:
"There is no doubt that art, which breaks into the crusted and hardened patterns of thought
and feeling in the present as though it were the prow of the future, is in radically altered
circumstances if the future is placed in doubt. The ground on which the artist stands when he
turns to his work has grown unsteady beneath his feet." (Schell, 1982: 163)65
Schell spoke of the artist, but he could have made the same case for all who create ideas
and objects. Future people add value to the creators' lives by making their creations durable. Here
the fact of a general assumption that people desire to have children is significant. An artist may
regard his work to be far more important than parenting, but he is helped by the presumption that
there will be future generations to bestow durability to his work.
The examples Schell pointed to were works of art and discoveries in the sciences. Those
creations are public goods, and most people don't have the talent to produce them. Confining
attention to public goods is not only limiting, it also raises an ethical dilemma: Suppose we all
were indifferent to having children and stared only at the prospective costs of raising them. We
would then free-ride, and the artist would be mistaken in his assumption that there will be future
people to give durability to his work.
Nevertheless, the direction Schell was pointing to is exactly right. Public goods aren't the
      Rawls (1972: 291) has a characteristically profound criticism of Kant's perspective.66
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only objects of ethical significance. Our values and practices are significant too. Many are
private, even confined to the family, and it is important to us that they are passed down the
generations. Procreation is a means of making one's values and practices durable. We imbue our
children with values we cherish and teach them the practices we believe are right not merely
because we think it is good for them, but also because we desire to see our values and practices
survive. Those values and practices are not public goods. On the contrary, we cherish them
because they are intimate. They are stories we tell our children about their grandparents' foibles,
of our own joys, sorrows, and discomfiture, and we instruct them on the family rituals we
ourselves inherited from our parents. It seems to me our descendants do something supremely
important for us: they add value to our lives that our own mortality would otherwise deprive them
of. That is the reason we would not practise reproductive free-riding even if we found
reproduction to be personally costly. The springs that motivate humankind to assume parenthood
are deep and abiding. Their genetic basis explains the motivation, but doesn't justify it.
Justification is found elsewhere. Our children provide us with a means of self-transcendence, the
widest avenue open to us of living through time, not merely in time. Mortality threatens to render
the achievements of our life transitory, and this threat is removed by procreation. The ability to
leave descendants enables us to invest in projects that will not cease to have value once we are
gone, projects that justify life rather than merely serve it. Alexander Herzen's remark, that human
development is a kind of chronological unfairness because those who live later profit from the
labour of their predecessors without paying the same price; and Kant's view that it is
disconcerting that earlier generations should carry their burdens only for the sake of the later
ones, that only the last should have the good fortune to dwell in the completed building - or in
other words, that we can do something for posterity but it can do nothing for us - are a reflection
of an extreme form of alienation.66
The motivation transmutes from the individual to the collective. Every generation is a
trustee of the wide range of capital stocks (be it cultural or moral, manufactured or natural) it has
inherited from the past. Looking backward, it acknowledges an implicit understanding with the
previous generation, of receiving the capital in return for its transmission, modified suitably in
the light of changing circumstances and increasing knowledge. Looking forward, it offers an
implicit proposal to the next generation, of bequeathing its stocks of capital that they in turn may
be modified suitably by it and then passed on to the following generation. As was noted in our
account of population ethics in a world moving through time, this perspective is not at odds with
either Total or Generation-Relative Utilitarianism. Generation-t is moved to internalize the
potential well-being of their descendants, as expressed in V(t). Our descendants are not us, but
      The idea of stewardship would appear to be common among different cultures. On African67
conceptions of intergenerational ethics, Behrens (2012: 189) writes: "African thought does not
limit moral considerability to only the current generation. It conceives of a web of life that
transcends generations, and of the environment as a resource shared by different generations.
This entails a direct moral obligation to preserve the environment for future persons, since it is
a communal good. Africans also expect that the current generation should develop an attitude of
gratitude towards their predecessors for having preserved the environment on their behalf. This
virtue of gratefulness ought to be realized by the current generation seeking to reciprocate by
preserving the environment for future generations, in turn." I am grateful to Simon Beard for this
reference.     
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they are not outside us either.67
Schell's reflections point also to the intrinsic value of Nature. It's a mistake to seek
justification for the preservation of ecological diversity, or more narrowly the protection of, say,
the giant redwoods, solely on instrumental grounds; that is on grounds that we know they are
useful to us or may prove useful to our descendants. Such arguments have a role but they are not
sufficient. Nor can the argument rely on the welfare of the members of such species (it does not
account for the special role that species preservation plays in the argument), or on the "rights"
of animals. A full justification bases itself as well on how we see ourselves, on what our rational
desires are. In examining our values and thus our lives, we should ask if the destruction of an
entire species-habitat for some immediate gratification is something we can live with
comfortably. The idea of intergenerational exchange is embedded in the perspective of eternity,
but the intellectual source of such exchange is a far cry from the conception that balked Herzen
in his effort to locate mutually beneficial terms of trade. The mistake is to see procreation and
ecological preservation as matters of personal and political morality. They are at least as much
a matter of personal and political ethics.
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Appendix
Generation-Relative Utilitarianism with Production
We consider a world where people are both producers and consumers. To do that we
extend the model studied in Section 8.1 and reinterpret Nature to be a capital good. Human
labour in combination with Nature produces a single consumption good.
Only adults are assumed to be capable of offering labour services. An individual therefore
consumes in both periods but produces only when an adult. We assume that if N(t) is the number
of adults at t, the output of the consumption good is
Y(t) = K[N(t)] 0 < â < 1. (A1)â
As all output is consumed, consumption per head is obtained from equation (A1) as
C(t) = K[N(t)] /[N(t)+N(t+1)]. (A2)â
Inserting this consumption structure in the model studied in Section 8.1, it is simple to confirm
that the optimum stationary consumption (and the corresponding population) sequence satisfies
dU(C)/dC = P**U(C)/C, (A3)
where
P** = 2ð(1+è)/(1+ð+2ðè(1-2â)). (A4)
Comparing equations (13) and (A4), we note that 0 < P < P**. That means other things
equal the proportionate gap between marginal well-being and average well-being per unit of
consumption is greater in a world where people are producers and consumers, not simply
consumers. Assume again that U(C) satisfies equation (2). Equation (A3) then reduces to 
C/C  = N /2N = [(ó + P**)/P**]  > 1. (A5)S S 1/ó
Let C**, and correspondingly N**, be the solutions of equation (A5). To obtain a feel for
the numbers that are involved, suppose as in the first of our illustrations in the sensitivity analysis
of Section 10.2 that ð = 0.1, è = 1 and ó = 1. There are any number of estimates in the literature
on labour's contribution to output as measured by its elasticity in production. In equation (A1)
the elasticity is â. P** in equation (A4) is a function of â. For illustration we, not unreasonably,
assume â = 0.5. It follows that P** . 0.364 and (ó+P**)/P** . 4. To a first approximation
production doesn't make much difference if â is in the neighbourhood of 0.5. Suppose, as in the
previous illustration, that C  = 7,200 dollars. Optimum population (2N**) is, as previously, 2.5S
billion and optimum consumption per capita (C**) is, again as previously, 28,800 dollars (PPP).
Both are far from where humanity is today.
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Table 1
Social Statistics from Rich and Poor Regions (Year 2010)
___________________________________________________________________________
rich poor
___________________________________________________________________________
Population (millions) 1,127 796
GDP per capita
(international dollars)       37,000      1,300
Total fertility rate* 1.8 4.1
Under-5 mortality rate
(per 1000) 6 108
Life expectancy at birth
(years) 80 59
Percentage enrollment
in secondary education 100 39 
___________________________________________________________________________
Source: World Bank (2012)
* Total fertility rate (TFR) is the number of successful pregnancies that a woman expects to have
during her reproductive years. The number 2.1 is usually taken to be the TFR that, over the long
run would lead to a stable population.




